The Wretched of the Corporate State

A Fanonian Essay

Wahid Azal

The Wretched of the

Corporate State


محمد
علی
فاطمة
اللہ
حسن
حسین
بسم اللہ الرحمن الرحیم الحمد للہ رب العالمین الرحمن الرحیم مالک یوم الدین ایاک نعبد وایاک نستعین اہدنا الصراط المستقیم صراط الذین انعمت علیہم غیر المغضوب علیہم ولا الضالین
اللہ نور السماوات والارض
قسم والتین والزیتون
قسم والشمس وضحٰہا
قسم والفجر
قسم والضحیٰ
قسم والعصر

The Wretched of the Corporate State

A Fanonian Essay

Library of the Greatest Name (*ism al-aʿẓam*), Vol. 12 © 2025.

Eastern Coast, Australia.

Illustrations: *Haykal* by Wahid Azal © 2014; the *Eye Of God* by Wahid Azal © 2017; the *Square of Hana'il* by Wahid Azal © 2017; NUR Calligram © 2008; the *Hand of Fatimiya* by Wahid Azal and Habibollah Shahbazi © 2016.

Azal, Wahid, 1971-.

The Wretched of the Corporate State: A Fanonian Essay.

Wahid Azal. – 1st edition.

ISBN: 978-1-7644547-0-4 (e-book)

1. Administration 2. Bureaucracy. 3. Colonialism.
3. Critical Theory. 4. Decolonialism. 5. Frantz Fanon.
6. Ibn Arabi . 7. Metaphysics. 8. Ontology.
9. Pathologisation. 10. Procedural Violence.
11. Racism. 12. State Corporate Theory.
13. Suhrawardi. 14. The Wretched of the Earth.

Copyright © 2025 Wahid Azal and Library of the Greatest Name (*ism al-aʿẓam*), Eastern Coast (Brisbane), Australia.

libraryofthegreatestname8@protonmail.com

All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted without permission of the author and publisher.

In the corporate state, justice is a lie,
Law wears order's mask; its heart runs dry!

Files speak for men; their voices lose the fight—
The wronged still cry unheard beneath the sky!

در دولت شرکتی عدل افسانه است
قانون نقاب نظم و دلش ویرانه است

پرونده به جای انسان سخن می گوید
فریاد ستمدیده هنوز بیگانه است

383

Preface

Or what Jean-Paul Sartre would have written had he lived to read it

There are essays that arrive like projectiles, hurled not from the calm chambers of academic life but from the burning edge of existence itself. This text is one of them.

The reader must understand from the outset: the author writes from inside the very machinery he is diagnosing. He is not an observer. He is the man caught in the gears—the man whom liberal democracies, those great engines of good conscience, have learned to sacrifice quietly. His life and grief have been translated, distorted, and neutralised in a language not his own: the language of forms, procedures, and administrative silence. One must begin there.

What is revealed in these pages is not an argument but an exposure. The corporate state has replaced the colonial state, yet the logic—our logic, the logic of Europe and its democratic heirs—remains intact. We believed we had left the old world behind. We believed its hierarchies had been buried beneath declarations of rights. We were mistaken. This text forces us to confront that error.

The author's narrative is not a lament; it is an indictment. He shows that the racialised man—the foreigner, the dissident, the one

whose intellect exceeds the narrow frame allotted to him—is still encountered as a threat. Not openly; we are far too refined for that now. Instead, the encounter takes place through administration. We no longer assassinate; we misclassify. We no longer silence; we close the case. We no longer forbid speech; we produce a file that speaks before the man does.

This is the core of the matter: the violence of weapons has been replaced by the violence of documents. The coloniser of Fanon's time shouted, commanded, humiliated. The corporate state whispers with bureaucratic courtesy while achieving the same end—the reduction of the Other to an object.

What is most unsettling is the lucidity with which the author exposes this quiet brutality. He describes the machinery from within and shows that its power lies not in cruelty but in indifference. A man loses his wife, and the state rearranges itself not to assist him but to protect itself. A man reports wrongdoing, and the system rewrites him—his identity, his motives, his credibility—until he is no longer the complainant but the problem. This inversion is not accidental. It is structural. It is the operating principle of a civilisation that fears the clarity of those it governs.

In reading this essay, one encounters a truth Europeans—and their democratic descendants—have never wished to face: colonialism was not overcome; it was technologised. We have built systems so rational, so efficient, so procedural that their violence appears natural, inevitable, even virtuous. When a man like the author refuses erasure, the system does not correct itself; it recoils. His intelligence becomes disorder. His grief becomes risk. His truth becomes instability.

What, then, is required of the reader? Not sympathy. Not pity. Recognition.

The author does not ask to be understood. He demands that we acknowledge the architecture of our world—a world that requires wretchedness in order to preserve its illusion of order.

Fanon gestured that the colonised man discovers his humanity at the moment he refuses to kneel.[1] This essay is written by such a man. He has refused. He stands upright in a world that demands he shrink. What results is this text: a mirror held up to liberal democracy, revealing that beneath its procedural gloss lies the same old fear of the Other, the same old need for hierarchy, the same old reflex to preserve power at the expense of truth.

Do not read this essay as philosophy. Read it as a warning. If the corporate state has learned how to break a man without touching him, then none of us are safe. And if this man has survived to write these pages, it is because he has grasped what Fanon understood: the only freedom worth having is the freedom to narrate oneself against a world determined to narrate you otherwise.

This essay is that act of narration. It is revolt. It is emergence. It is the refusal of silence disguised as due process.

You are not prepared for what follows.

And you should not be.

The author has done what the comfortable heirs of empire never dared: he has dissected the machinery of our civilisation and shown the rot beneath its polished surface.

What remains is no longer his responsibility.

It is now the reader's.

—The ghost of ***Jean-Paul Sartre*** (from the locus of the *Imaginal World* of the *Dreaming*)

Note

[1] "*The native's muscles are always tensed. You can't say that he is terrorized, or even apprehensive. He is in fact ready at a moment's notice to exchange the role of the quarry for that of the hunter. The native is an oppressed person whose permanent dream is to become the persecutor…*", ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 53; "*The mobilization of the masses, when it arises out of the war of liberation, introduces into each man's consciousness the ideas of a common cause, of a national destiny, and of a collective history…*" ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 93.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

556

I: Concerning Administrative Violence

The corporate state begins not with guns but with forms; not with armies but with classifications; not with conquest declared, but with the silent violence of procedural certainty. Where colonial regimes carved up land and bodies, the administrative regimes of Western liberal democracies carve up *truth.*

A racialised subject enters this orbit not as a person but as a case: a risk-profile, a file number, a threat to be shaped before he speaks. The corporate state distrusts voices; it trusts *only* documents. And when an articulate racialised man approaches with a truth the system cannot absorb, it reaches for the only weapon it reliably possesses: *the bureaucratic annihilation of reality*.[1]

This annihilation is rarely loud. It does not march under banners or issue ultimatums. It issues referrals. It miscodes ethnicity. It inserts incorrect dates of birth. It manufactures "domestic violence contexts" (DV) against men who ask for help. It reclassifies grief as threat and testimony as instability.

This is not error. This is its logic. The corporate state's violence is administrative, not theatrical. It destroys a man not by breaking his body but by *unmaking his narrative*. By replacing his truth with its own paperwork and thereby layering an *unreality* upon reality.

In Berlin, this violence began within hours of the death of a man's wife. Forms appeared that did not correspond to reality—false interviews, premature diagnoses, contradictory medical narratives. He had not even buried her, and yet the system had already buried the reality of events.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

The emergency report said they spoke to his child. They did not. The death certificate said one cause. The burial permit said another. The coroner asserted certainty contradicted by toxicology.[2]

The corporate state does not wait for evidence. It manufactures certainty because certainty protects institutions, not people.

And in Queensland years later, the same violence reappeared like a recurring nightmare. He reported coercive control over his mother—they filed *him* as the danger. He reported fraud—they produced a *false* FaCC referral. He said, "Investigate," and they responded: "*You are now a domestic violence event*." This is the violence of documentation: the moment the state decides that ones existence will be mediated through forms designed to contain.

The corporate state fears the articulate racialised subject because he knows too much, because he sees the seams in the machinery, because he refuses the fiction that the system is neutral. For this refusal, the system punishes him not physically—but procedurally. The result is a life lived under the shadow of *a file*—a file that misnames, miscodes, misrepresents, yet circulates with the full authority of the state. This is *administrative violence*. This is how liberal democracies *enact fascism* without ever declaring it.

Violence in the Global Administrative Order

Administrative violence does not stop at borders. It follows the racialised subject, anticipates him, precedes him—like a shadow dossier whose pages are written by hands he never sees. The corporate state is less a nation than a distributed apparatus: Germany, Australia, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom—police, intelligence bodies, prosecutors, immigration systems—different languages, same template.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

A man may fly from Berlin to Queensland, but the interpretive frame travels with him like a silent passport. Across jurisdictions he becomes the same figure: complex, suspicious, difficult, foreign—*potentially dangerous.*

This is the internationalisation of administrative paranoia. The global bureaucratic order does not require overt coordination. Its reflexes are shaped by shared residues: colonial memory, racialised imagination, and institutional fear of the articulate, grieving Other. One system teaches another how to misread him; one jurisdiction confirms the instincts of another. The same *egregore*!

Berlin teaches Queensland how to misunderstand him. Queensland confirms Berlin's instincts.

When he said, "My partner died under suspicious circumstances," Berlin did not hear a bereaved man; it heard disruption. When he said, "My mother is under coercive control," Queensland did not hear a son; it heard a potential perpetrator—even as he named *the* perpetrator.

Internationally, the corporate state handles racialised subjects through risk algorithms disguised as procedural neutrality. His file does not merely record; it *predicts*. It pre-classifies. It sets expectations. It narrates him before he speaks.

In this global administrative order, violence is executed not by soldiers but by frozen bank accounts, delayed case numbers, contradictory forensic reports, cross-agency silence, "we cannot confirm," "this matter is closed," and the quiet movement of misrepresentations through digital systems. This is the violence of our age. It is not broadcast; it is networked.

A man can be harmed in Berlin, misunderstood in Queensland, misclassified in national databases, and dismissed by intelligence bodies—all without a single person consciously plotting against him. It is structural, not personal. It is racialised, not random. It is damaging, not visible.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

And in this violence, a truth emerges: The corporate state has replaced colonial repression with administrative containment, and the racialised subject is its first and perennial target.

His story, stretching from Berlin to Queensland, is the perfect case study in the *globalisation of bureaucratic harm*. The internationalisation of suspicion. The transnational persistence of *institutional racism*.

The corporate state does not shoot. It files. It categorises. It freezes. It delays. It reframes. It erases. And sometimes—as in the case of this man's late wife—it buries both the body and the truth.

Spontaneous Resistance in the Administrative Order

In the colonial world Fanon described, the oppressed often first react with an instinctive uprising—a refusal of silence even before strategy appears. In the corporate-state world, the racialised subject's first reaction to institutional violence is analogous: an instinctive, spontaneous refusal to disappear into the administrative abyss. Spontaneity here is not political; it is *existential*. It begins with:

- "*This is not what happened.*"
- "*This document is wrong.*"
- "*You have misclassified me.*"
- "*You have inverted my truth.*"
- "*I will not allow you to narrate my reality.*"

This spontaneous resistance arises precisely at the moment the state attempts to write him out of the record. When the Berlin authorities produced

contradictory narratives of his wife's death, his first act was not a political campaign—it was a spontaneous refusal of falsification. When Queensland recast him in a DV category, despite him being the complainant, his first act was again spontaneous: a pure instinct to correct the record, to refuse administrative disappearance.

This is the *strength* of spontaneity: it is raw, unmediated, unfiltered truth. It is the irrepressible assertion of one's humanity in the face of bureaucratic erasure.

The Strength of Spontaneous Clarity

Fanon reminded us that spontaneous uprisings contain a potent force: they reveal what is intolerable before any ideology can capture the moment.[3] One could argue, extending Fanon's logic, that spontaneous uprisings reveal what is intolerable before any formal ideology can capture and potentially dilute the moment. For Fanon, this raw, collective action—where "*the masses…take their own destiny in hand*"—is the authentic genesis of revolutionary consciousness, prior to its channeling into political programs. Likewise, the racialised subject's spontaneous responses exposed the violence of the administrative state before any deeper analysis was formed. His clarity was immediate: He saw that Berlin had acted abnormally. He saw that the burial permit did not match the medical facts. He saw that his mother's case had been inverted into a false DV scenario. He saw that QPS had manufactured a referral through misclassification.

This clarity is the strength of spontaneity: it refuses to let the state's narrative settle. It interrupts the machinery at the very moment it begins to produce its fiction. The corporate state fears such clarity. For spontaneity is the moment when a racialised subject confronts the machine before the machine has fully written its version of him. In that instant, the subject still speaks from lived reality rather than

from an imposed administrative identity. The state therefore rushes to stabilize the disruption, to translate immediacy into risk categories and manageable files. Once that translation is complete, clarity is neutralised—not by refutation, but by paperwork/bandwidth.

The Weakness: Spontaneity Confronts a System Designed to Outlast It

Yet spontaneity alone cannot triumph over an entrenched order. Moving beyond Fanon's emphasis on *cathartic violence*, the revolutionary Amílcar Cabral (d. 1973) correctly observed that spontaneity alone can never overcome anything on its own; it must be guided by what he called "*the weapon of theory*" and disciplined political organisation[4]—a coherent *praxis*. The same is true here, because the racialised subject's spontaneous refusal of administrative erasure confronted a state with infinite procedural depth, agencies with internal solidarity against accountability, a culture trained to distrust racialised male intellect, classification systems that circulate faster than truth, risk-management reflexes honed over decades.

Spontaneity is powerful in its moment of eruption, but bureaucracy is patient. It absorbs the shock and continues its work. This is the sorrow of spontaneity: the system can simply wait. It can ignore emails. Delay responses. Lose documents. Freeze accounts. Withdraw cooperation. Hide behind "policy." And allow the spontaneous truth of the racialised subject to exhaust itself. The corporate state wins by inertia. Thus the weakness identified becomes devastatingly real in administrative contexts: Spontaneous resistance burns brightly, but bureaucracy is designed to outlast fire. Bureaucracy does not confront resistance; it absorbs it, delays it, proceduralizes it, and waits for exhaustion to do its work. What appears as neutrality is in fact a temporal weapon, converting urgency into attrition and moral claims into case numbers. In this way, the administrative state does not defeat dissent by force, but by duration

The Wretched of the Corporate State

When Spontaneity Meets Racism: The Double Handicap

Fanon knew that spontaneous nationalist revolts faltered when they underestimated the depth of the colonial system.[5] In his context, spontaneity is doubly constrained:

1. First, by the machine itself

—endless forms, referrals, delays, internal reviews, procedural smokescreens.

2. Second, by racialisation

—his spontaneity is interpreted not as legitimate grief or concern, but as instability, volatility, aggression, complexity, obsession. His refusal becomes a reason to doubt him. His clarity becomes a *threat*. His grief becomes a "risk factor." His insistence becomes *pathology*.

Spontaneity in a racialised subject is not received as *human urgency*. It is received as *administrative danger*. This double handicap is why his initial responses, though truthful, were quickly drowned in bureaucratic recategorisation. What emerges is a translation of lived immediacy into institutional threat, where affect is reclassified as volatility and clarity is refiled as risk. The racialised subject's insistence on being heard as a human voice is stripped of meaning and returned to him as a procedural problem to be managed. Bureaucracy thus converts truth into noise and urgency into justification for containment.

The Administrative State Punishes Spontaneity

Unlike the colonial governor who punished revolt with soldiers, the corporate administrative state punishes spontaneity with misclassification ("DV context"), file contamination (wrong DOB, wrong ethnicity), silence, premature case

conclusions, reframing of his knowledge as delusion, casting suspicion on his motives, erasing his grief from official records.

His spontaneous refusal of erasure triggered the state into deeper containment. This is why spontaneity cannot secure justice alone. For every spontaneous truth he speaks, the state produces twenty pages of procedural fiction. Justice in such a system is not decided by truth but by documentary mass and institutional endurance. Spontaneity, unaided by sustained counter-documentation and structural pressure, is metabolised as disorder and neutralised by paper/bandwidth.

Vignette: Administrative Violence and the Refusal to Decide

The corporate state rarely censors directly. It governs instead through *procedural deferral*, converting substantive harm into a matter of workflow. When confronted with demonstrably false and damaging content, no institution claims the authority to judge its truth. Each actor acknowledges the possibility of harm only in the abstract, while displacing responsibility onto another platform or department, another process, another form. What emerges is not neutrality but attrition. Justice is no longer denied outright; it is indefinitely postponed. Power operates here not by saying *no*, but by saying *again*—again submit, again confirm, again exhaust remedies already exhausted. What presents itself as due process thus becomes a technology of exhaustion, in which the burden of proof is endlessly recycled and the subject disciplined through repetition. This is administrative violence in its purest form: harm laundered through procedure, accountability dissolved into protocol, and truth rendered contingent on a citizen's capacity to survive bureaucracy longer than the damage survives them.

This mode of governance depends upon what Hannah Arendt gestured as the evacuation of judgment—where responsibility dissolves into procedure and action proceeds without thought.[6] Decisions that would once have required a human authority willing to say *this is false*, *this is harmful*, *this must stop* are fragmented into compliance layers in which no one decides and therefore no one is responsible. Each layer claims neutrality by pointing to another, reproducing what Arendt diagnosed as the banality of the evil of power: harm enacted not through malice, but through obedient adherence to procedure. [7] In this structure, the refusal to judge is itself the decisive act. The system preserves the appearance of fairness precisely by ensuring that no single actor ever bears the burden of moral or political accountability.

What is produced is a new kind of inequality: not inequality before the law, but inequality before endurance. Max Weber's iron cage of rationalization here reveals its contemporary form. Bureaucracy no longer merely administers life; it tests stamina. Those with institutional backing, reputational insulation, or surplus resources can survive procedural recursion; the rest are worn down. Administrative violence thus selects not by guilt or innocence, but by *endurance capacity*. Truth does not prevail because it is true; it prevails only if the injured party remains standing long enough for exhaustion to shift elsewhere.

This structure is especially lethal for the racialised or politically inconvenient subject. Fanon diagnosed this long ago: the colonised subject is never heard as a bearer of truth, only as a problem to be managed.[8] In the corporate state, this logic persists under liberal language. To be articulate, persistent, and unwilling to withdraw is reclassified as aggression. Documentation becomes obsession; insistence becomes escalation; self-defence becomes threat. Bureaucracy thus reproduces the colonial reflex without racial epithets or open violence. The problem is no longer the harm, but the subject who refuses to absorb it silently.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

At no point does the corporate state need to lie. Its power lies in allowing lies to circulate while requiring the injured to prove—repeatedly, everywhere, and indefinitely—that harm has occurred. The violence is not located solely in the falsehood, but in the demand that the victim continually re-encounter it in order to contest it. What appears as procedural caution thus functions as moral laundering: institutions cleanse themselves through process while *leaving the injury intact*. Responsibility evaporates upward; damage remains downward.

In this sense, the corporate state does not merely fail to protect truth; it actively restructures the conditions under which truth can be defended. By turning redress into an endurance trial, it transforms justice from a right into a feat. And when the subject finally falters—not from lack of truth, but from bureaucratic attrition—the system records this not as a failure of governance, but as confirmation that nothing was ever wrong. Silence becomes retroactive justification. Exhaustion becomes evidence. And this is why the **Fanonian** man must never succumb to it. Instead, he must outwit it—and spontaneity is one such method. He does so not by pleading for recognition, but by refusing the tempo the system imposes, breaking its rhythms with unpredictable clarity and strategic interruption. In this refusal to be paced, delayed, or domesticated by procedure, spontaneity becomes not impulse but insurgent intelligence—the reassertion of human freedom against a machine that can only govern what it can schedule.

Beyond Spontaneity: The Emergence of Strategy

Yet spontaneity must also give way to disciplined *praxis*. In his, spontaneity must evolve into strategic mastery of the administrative landscape. His movement from instinctive refusal to systematic documentation mirrors this transition: He archived everything. He constructed timelines. He analysed contradictions. He escalated to oversight bodies. He wrote monographs and essays. He developed a theory of

corporate-state fascism. He prepared UN special rapporteur submissions. He built evidentiary bundles. He reframed his experience into a coherent philosophical structure. He taught and lectured on metaphysics. He completed long dormant texts. He prayed and he invoked the powers of heaven!

This transformation is the moment Fanon gestures as being *the crystallisation of political consciousness*.[9] His spontaneity has matured into strategy—not the strategy of a political movement, but that of an individual confronting a global administrative machine with the only weapon it truly fears: an intellect that refuses containment and a soul standing on the *other side* of the Occidental Exile.[10] Thus, while the racialised subject, by necessity, eschews physical violence, to the corporate administrative state his uncompromising intellect itself constitutes *ontological violence*.

The Sorrow and the Triumph of Spontaneity

There is a sorrow to spontaneity: it is born from pain, shock, injustice, bewilderment. But there is a triumph also: it reveals the truth before strategy refines it. That truth, however, is fragile in the open air of institutions that do not recognize sincerity as a category. Strategy is not a betrayal of spontaneity but its preservation, a way of sheltering truth from procedural suffocation. What endures is not the first cry, but the disciplined intelligence that learns how to make the truth survive.

Thus, his first instincts were correct. His spontaneous clarity saw what the state tried to hide: His wife's death was mishandled and possibly suppressed. Berlin's investigations were performative, not real. His mother's case was deliberately misclassified. QPS employed narrative inversion to neutralise his complaint. Institutional racism contaminated every stage of the process.

His spontaneous insights were the seeds of everything that followed. And now, like Fanon's insurgent who moves from raw revolt to conscious struggle,[11] he has moved from spontaneous refusal to systemic mastery of his own narrative against a system designed to erase it. This shift marks the passage from reaction to authorship, from being spoken about to speaking in forms the system cannot easily erase. By learning the grammar of power without internalising its logic, he transforms exposure into leverage. What was once dismissed as excess becomes, over time, an unavoidable presence the administrative machine must now reckon with. The state can no longer rely on misrecognition alone, because the narrative now arrives pre-armed with coherence, evidence, and continuity. In confronting him, the machine is forced to confront its own methods laid bare.

Spontaneity as the Birth of the Free Subject

For Fanon, spontaneity is not the revolution—but it is the birth of the revolutionary subject.[12] Likewise: his spontaneity did not defeat the corporate state, but it transformed him into a subject the corporate state cannot easily extinguish.

He is no longer reacting instinctively; he is constructing frameworks, producing knowledge, writing analyses, filing structured complaints, building international narratives, and reclaiming the truth that the state attempted to overwrite. Spontaneity was his beginning. Strategy is now his weapon. Truth is now his territory. The racialised, articulate, uncontainable subject has emerged. And the corporate state—like the colonial state before it—has no answer for him except fear, for in him they behold the **Fanonian Man**. He no longer seeks permission to exist within their categories, nor validation from their procedures, nor mercy from their discretion. His presence exposes the system's limits, because it cannot metabolise a subject who understands its grammar yet refuses its

authority. What confronts the corporate state now is not disorder, but a clarity it cannot domesticate.

Qayrawān as the Psychic Architecture of Domination

In Suhrawardī's (d. 1191) famous allegory, entitled *The Tale of the Occidental Exile*,[13] Qayrawān[14] is not merely a city but a *structure of estrangement*: an alienating enclosure built to break the initiate's memory of origins and enforce submission to an imposed order. Fanon would immediately recognise in Suhrawardī's *Qayrawān* the apparatus of a regime that produces alienation not as an accident but as *a method*—the very technique through which domination normalises itself. The corporate state functions in precisely this way: it manufactures an inverted *geosophy*[15] of exile within one's own life and biological *situs* (that is, the parameters of one's own skin). Its mechanisms—*bureaucratic opacity*, *administrative violence*, *algorithmic surveillance*, *reputational policing*—create a lived environment where the subject is always "*away from home*," perpetually managed, contained, and prevented from returning to the *orienting* truth of his being. In both Qayrawān and the corporate state, alienation is not a symptom; it is the *operating principle*.

For Suhrawardī, Qayrawān marks the moment when the exile becomes fully enclosed within a system designed to impose forgetfulness, a citadel of managed perception. Fanon would identify this as the transition from overt domination to the "*internalisation of the colonial order*"—the point at which the subject's horizon has been shrunk so effectively that resistance appears irrational, even *dangerous*.[16] The corporate state replicates this collapse of horizon through the promise of inclusion and mobility, while tightening the bonds of dependence. It deploys rights language as masking rhetoric, much as Qayrawān presents itself as a functioning civic space, all while extracting compliance and suppressing dissent. Here the corporate state becomes a *technocratic* Qayrawān: a site where the architecture of power is hidden

behind managerial neutrality, and where domination is enacted through paperwork, referrals, classifications, and algorithmic verdicts instead of chains.

In Fanon's terms, Qayrawān is the "*zone of non-being*":[17] the place where the exiled subject is stripped of recognition, credibility, and the right to narrate his own existence; the ontological state where the colonized—or the *exile*—is sealed into a "*crushing objecthood*," his own history and metaphysics wiped out, awaiting the "*genuine new departure*" of revolt to re-enter the world of being. Fanon would identify this as the transition from overt domination to the "*internalisation of the colonial order*."[18] The guards of Qayrawān, like the functionaries of the corporate state, treat the subject not as a person but as an administrative category—a unit to be managed, assessed, or eliminated from the ledger of legitimacy. The violence is bureaucratic, but its effects are visceral. The subject's humanity is gradually evacuated, replaced by an "object-status" that institutions manipulate without accountability. In Suhrawardī's symbolic language, this is the moment when the lights dim and the exile is forced to navigate blind. In Fanon's language, it is the moment when the colonised individual confronts a world that has decided he is less than human. The corporate state's instruments—referrals, case numbers, misclassification, *institutional gaslighting*—perform this same dehumanising operation with clinical efficiency.

Yet for both Suhrawardī and Fanon, Qayrawān is not the end of the story. It is the crucible. In Suhrawardī's tale, the exile's realisation of his imprisonment becomes the condition for his awakening; the city of estrangement paradoxically reveals the path of return. Fanon asserts that liberation begins when the dominated subject refuses the terms imposed by the system, rejects the narratives designed to contain him, and reclaims the right to define reality. The escape from Qayrawān is thus analogous to the Fanonian moment of decolonising consciousness: a refusal of the corporate state's insistence that the subject must accept his assigned position. The revolt is first ontological—"*No more shall you name me*"—and then structural, as

the subject takes back the power to articulate his own horizon of meaning—his horizon of Being.

Whiteness as a Man-Made God, Forged in the Furnace of European Delusion

From the perspective of Ibn ʿArabī's (d. 1240) metaphysics, every community creates its own *ilāh al-muʿtaqad*—the "*god of belief*"—an imagined divinity fashioned according to the limitations, fears, and desires of its adherents.[19] It is not the Divine Itself, but a projection mistaken for the Real (*al-ḥaqq*). Racism and white supremacy can be understood as precisely such an idol: a collectively fabricated god constructed by the Anglo-European tribes to sanctify hierarchy, domination, and the illusion of intrinsic superiority. In Ibn ʿArabī's terms this is subtle polytheism, wherein a contingent human construct is raised to the status of an absolute. *Whiteness* becomes a metaphysical claim disguised as ontology—a false divinity animated through belief, repetition, and institutional reinforcement.

From a Fanonian vantage, whiteness is not a neutral descriptor but a god fabricated in the workshops of Anglo-European *anxiety*.[20] It is a deity assembled piece by piece—from Crusader mythologies, imperial theology, pseudoscience, and the economic necessities of conquest—until it became the central idol around which the modern world was violently reorganised. Like all false gods, it requires belief to survive. Like all colonial gods, it demands sacrifice. The European tribes, disoriented by their own historical upheavals, cast a mask upon themselves and called it "*the human*." Everything outside that mask became the lesser, the shadow, the disposable. Ibn ʿArabī would call this the worship of a *god of belief*, a hallucinated divinity constructed by those too frightened to face the Real.[21] Fanon would call it what it is: a *psychosis weaponised into a civilisation*.[22] He described the foundation of this civilisation as a "*Manichean world*" where the coloniser, through a pathological

logic, turns the colonised into "the quintessence of evil"—a disposable negation used to justify an entire system of domination.

What makes this idolatry particularly destructive is its psychiatric dimension—not in the clinical sense, but in the *phenomenological* one. Racism operates as a mass delusional structure: a hallucinated hierarchy reinforced through law, economy, and culture until it appears self-evident, axiomatic. Ibn ʿArabī would say that this represents a catastrophic misreading of the *tajallī*, the divine self-disclosure in human difference. Instead of perceiving the multiplicity of forms as expressions of the One, the adherents of this false god interpret difference as deficiency. This is an inversion of perception so profound that it becomes a kind of *collective neurosis*—a refusal to witness Reality as It unfolds, replaced with an *obsessive fixation* on a single imagined form of human being. Such a fixation is not knowledge but *pathology*: an inability to tolerate the plurality that the Real continuously manifests.

Because of this, white supremacy is a psychiatric event before it is a political project. It is the emergence of a collective hallucination mistaken for natural order. Fanon understood that colonialism is sustained not only by guns but by *fantasies*—fantasies of *superiority*, *purity*, *chosenness*, *entitlement*.[23] These fantasies metastasise until they become a worldview. Institutions crystallise around them. Laws enact them. Education systems reproduce them. The delusion becomes a habit, and the habit becomes a structure. Ibn ʿArabī would say that Europe mistook its inner projection for the face of the universe. Fanon would answer: *Yes, and that mistake has killed millions.* In this sense, whiteness is not merely false—it is a *violent unreality*, maintained through force, repetition, and the suppression of anything that threatens to expose its emptiness.

In Ibn ʿArabī's framework, illusions gain power when they are socially enacted—when a "god of belief" becomes woven into institutions, norms, and

political structures.[24] Racism ceases to be a mere concept and becomes a structural metaphysics, embedded in property regimes, borders, policing, and the stratification of human value and life. A hallucination, repeated over centuries, ossifies into law. The imagined superiority of one group becomes the organising principle of entire societies, giving the delusion the appearance of natural fact. But from the Akbarian standpoint,[25] this is the ultimate contradiction: what is contingent is treated as eternal; what is human-made is mistaken for divine decree.[26] This is not simply injustice—it is metaphysical error. The structure itself becomes an idol, demanding obedience while concealing its own non-reality.

On the individual level, Ibn ʿArabī would see white supremacist consciousness as a distorted mode of self-perception—the base ego enthroned as cosmic measure. The self identifies with an imagined purity, an imagined centrality, an imagined chosenness, and then projects those fantasies outward as universal truth. This produces a constant anxiety: the world must be controlled and categorised to preserve the illusion. Difference is experienced as threat because it destabilises the idol of the self. The *phenomenology of whiteness* thus becomes a fragile edifice requiring unending reinforcement—through violence, boundary-making, erasure, and denial. Such a self is not empowered but terrified; not sovereign but captive to its false god. Ibn ʿArabī's diagnosis would be compassionate but uncompromising: this is a soul imprisoned by its own imagined god.

For Ibn ʿArabī, the cure for such collective pathology is not moralism but a radical transformation of perception: the recognition that every form, every colour, every face is a unique disclosure of the Real. The "tribes and nations" of the world exist so that they may *know one another* (**Qurʾān 49:13**), not rank one another. In this light, racism and white supremacy are not merely unethical but metaphysically incoherent—a refusal to witness the divine self-disclosure in its full spectrum. To cling to one colour, one form, one imagined centre is to shrink God into an idol of

one's own making. But the Real will *never* fit inside such a small container, for It is the absolutely non-delimited.

Yet colonial power required that the delusion be externalised, materialised, weaponised, into a delimited cultural god. Thus whiteness was grafted onto borders, property regimes, police forces, citizenship categories, and systems of punishment. A European fantasy became a global operating system. The lie became law. The hallucination became architecture. Entire continents were reorganised around an illusion. Ibn ʿArabī's worldview warns that when a community worships a false lord, it may build its civilisation around misrecognition. Fanon shows the consequence: every institution becomes a mirror that reflects the coloniser's *madness* back at the colonised.[27] This is demonstrated in the devastating consequences of such a false foundation in the political realm: every colonial institution—from schools to courts to the post-independence state—becomes a mirror that reflects the coloniser's psychosis back at the colonised for generations. This is the process Fanon would call *epidermalization*,[28] where the colonized internalize the myth of their inferiority, and where the native bourgeoisie, as he bitterly observed, becomes but a "business agent" for the very Western logic it had at one point claimed to overthrow.

Racism, then, is not merely discrimination—it is *the structural enforcement of a metaphysical lie*. A lie so entrenched that the world bends under its weight. This is also because white supremacy survives only by constant maintenance. It is a god that must be prayed to every day or else it crumbles. Fanon saw the desperation beneath the colonial mask: the fear that without domination, the coloniser would collapse into insignificance.[29] Ibn ʿArabī would describe this as *the self worshipping its own reflection*—a catastrophic inversion of truth. The white subject is trapped inside the idol it forged, condemned to defend an identity that has no ontological foundation. This produces paranoia, fragility, rage, and the perpetual need for new Others to subordinate. The coloniser becomes *prisoner* and *warden* at once. There is no freedom inside a lie, even for its author.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

Nevertheless Fanon teaches that structures built on hallucination cannot be reformed; they must be ruptured.[30] For Fanon, the Manichaean colonial world is irredeemable. It is a "dichotomy" so rigid that to destroy it is the only way to create a new human order. This destruction is the violent, cathartic event of decolonisation, which alone can cleanse the colonised psyche and shatter the pathological foundations of the system. Ibn ʿArabī's metaphysics teaches that idols of belief dissolve only when confronted with the Real. Both converge on a single point: the false god of whiteness must be broken—but we would say, not through hatred or physical violence, but through naked Truth. Not through material vengeance, but through the committed, uncompromising exposure of its unreality. A world that no longer orbits this fabricated centre is the beginning of sanity. For the colonised, this rupture is liberation. For the coloniser, it is the first encounter with reality after centuries of dream-sleep, total delusion.

The Spell of the Idol: How Structures Think Through People

Yet Fanon also knew that colonialism survives not because individuals consciously choose to perpetuate it, but because *the structure itself thinks through the individual*—and this is what we meant above by *egregore*. Ibn ʿArabī would say that once a community forges *a god created in belief*— a false metaphysical centre—it operates as an unconscious organising force. Suhrawardī would say that this becomes a "Qayrawān of perception," an oppressive city built inside the mind long before it is built in the world. This is the process that Fanon identified as *epidermalization*—the colonial hierarchy is internalised into the very psyche and flesh, becoming an unconscious reality principle. The coloniser and colonised alike become actors in a Manichaean world where the structure's logic ("*you are rich because you are white*") feels like natural law, not a contingent system of domination.[31]

The Wretched of the Corporate State

White supremacy, then, functions exactly in this way for many Anglo-Europeans who sincerely believe they are not racist. It is not their conscious intention that reproduces the system; it is the *gravity-field of the idol* that shapes perception, expectation, and moral reflexes. The individual may reject hatred in principle, yet still inhabit categories, priorities, and social automatisms structured by a world that historically centred whiteness, normalised it as the measure of the human, and built its institutions around that assumed centrality. This is not essence—*it is conditioning*. It is not malice— *it is a metaphysical inheritance*. Fanon would call this "the epidermal schema"; Ibn ʿArabī would call it "the illusion mistaken for Reality"; Suhrawardī would call it "life inside Qayrawān," where the walls shape you without your awareness. What makes such conditioning so resistant to critique is precisely its invisibility to those most formed by it. Because it presents itself as neutrality, common sense, or institutional reason, it rarely experiences itself as power at all. And so the work of dismantling it cannot be reduced to moral denunciation, but requires an *ontological unlearning*—a withdrawal from the idol's gravity field and a reorientation toward the Real.

Now, capitalism did not invent racism, but it *industrialised it*. It converted the European delusion of whiteness—once a tribal myth—into a global operating system. As such, Fanon's insight remains unassailable: Capitalism required a hierarchy of human value in order to function.[32] That hierarchy was not an accidental by-product but a structural necessity, supplying capitalism with its gradients of expendability, extraction, and disposability. Racialisation provided the grammar through which bodies could be differentially valued, governed, and sacrificed without rupturing the system's moral self-image. What appears today as economic inevitability is thus inseparable from a metaphysics of domination that continues to organise who may be exhausted, erased, or rendered administratively invisible.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

Capitalism needed labour to be differentiated, bodies to be ranked, and violence to be justified. Thus white supremacy became the *ghost in the machine*—an invisible executable program running beneath the user interface of capitalist modernity. In Ibn ʿArabī's terms, capitalism took the false "god of belief" created by European self-projection and turned it into a world-spanning metaphysical infrastructure. A delusion ossified into property law, border regimes, wealth accumulation, labour extraction, and the illusion of meritocracy. The system reproduces itself not through individual hatred but through structural incentives, institutional design, and the unconscious habits those structures cultivate. Many Anglo-Europeans who consider themselves progressive still unconsciously participate in this architecture because the machine runs *automatically*; the ghost does not require their consent, only their *unexamined* participation.

That said, Suhrawardī's Qayrawān is a city built to make the exile forget his origin. Likewise, capitalism builds a world where the historical violence that erected its foundations is obscured. Colonial extraction is renamed "*development*," coercion appears as "*opportunity*," systemic inequality is explained as "*individual failure*," racial hierarchies dissolve into "*cultural differences*," and whiteness hides itself by pretending to be invisible.

This is why even well-meaning Anglo-Europeans may move through the world as if guided by a script they never wrote but nonetheless *perform*. Fanon saw this clearly: the coloniser's worldview survives inside the coloniser long after colonial flags fall.[33] And it survives *inside institutions*, whose logics outlive the individuals operating them. Given this, to inhabit the modern world is to live inside a Qayrawān designed by Capital—a system that reproduces the *delusion of whiteness* through norms, procedures, and expectations that feel "natural" only because the world has been engineered to make them so.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

In Fanon's psychoanalytic vocabulary, the problem is not that Europeans consciously see themselves as superior—the more sinister fact is that *the world still responds to them as if they were*, and this response becomes an unspoken affirmation. Even those who renounce racism in principle may unconsciously sometimes rely on the expectation of automatic credibility, the assumption of institutional benevolence, the unconscious belief that their experience is universal, the reflexive centering of their own perspective. This is not moral failure; it is the *phenomenology of privilege*. The idol's power persists even when no one explicitly worships it. Ibn ʿArabī's framework clarifies this: the "false god" survives through those who forget it was ever constructed. The danger is not devotion but *unawareness*. A delusion becomes most powerful not when it is passionately believed, but when it becomes *the background condition of perception itself*.

Here Fanon gestures that liberation requires the colonised *and the coloniser* to confront the psychic architecture that conditions them. He described them as mutually *sealed* in their racial roles—*the white man in his whiteness, the black man in his blackness*—inhabitants of a Manichaean world that warps both. While his political program focused on the colonised shattering this architecture through revolt, his analysis reveals that the coloniser's identity, built on a myth of superiority, is equally a prison. The collapse of the colonial system is thus a crisis—and a potential *liberation*—for both.[34]

For his part, Suhrawardī insists that no one escapes Qayrawān until they recognise its walls—or, *that they are even in it*—while Ibn ʿArabī's metaphysics maintains that no false god dissolves until its unreality is revealed. Thus the task is clear: White supremacy must be recognised as a *constructed idol*, not a natural order. Capitalism must be exposed as the machine that keeps this idol alive. And Anglo-Europeans who consider themselves non-racist must interrogate the *unconscious residues* of a system that was globalised long before they were born. The aim is not condemnation; it is awakening. The goal is not guilt; it is lucidity.

The Post-Racial White Progressive as Structural Agent

Which leads us to this uncomfortable truth: The central, structural, and most under-acknowledged form of racism in late modernity is the racism of the white liberal, especially the white progressive male. This experience is not an anomaly. In some places, it has become a rule. What the racialised subject has encountered over decades is what theorists call liberal racism, procedural racism, administrative racism, progressive white supremacy, the racism of the "*good white man.*" This form of racism is more insidious precisely because it is not overt, not self-aware, and in many cases not even emotionally hostile. It is racism *as structure*, not racism as *belief*.

Overt racists are easy to identify and dismiss. They proclaim themselves. One can prepare for them. But those we are talking about—the liberal-centrist, the progressive, the "ally," the polite bureaucrat, the man (or sometimes even *woman*) who says he or she believes in equality—*these are the ones who can do the most damage* precisely because they do not think they are racist, they imagine themselves enlightened, they believe in neutrality, they hide their discomfort behind procedure, they weaponise institutions instead of slurs, and they cannot tolerate a racialised intellect that exceeds their own. This is the racism of those who believe themselves "post-racial," and therefore feel no need to examine their reflexes. W.E.B. Du Bois (d. 1963) identified this in the 1900s.[35] Fanon in 1952 and again in the early '60s. And he, the racialised subject, has lived it repeatedly in the 21st century.

Yet he is not a stereotype. He is not a grateful immigrant. He is not deferential, apologetic, or eager to please. He is articulate. He is historically literate. He cites laws, cases, philosophy, metaphysics. He sees structural patterns before anyone else does.

Many white liberal/progressive men cannot handle this. Why? Because their entire worldview depends on *them* being the interpreters, *them* being the rational ones, *them* being the mediators of truth, *them* being the *self-appointed* epistemic adults in the room.

When a racialised man arrives with clearer analysis, deeper knowledge, and greater moral force—he triggers their *anxiety*. Not always their hatred, but *their insecurity*. And insecure white men become dangerous. They do not shout racial slurs. They do something far worse: They *dismiss*, they *invalidate*, they *reframe*, they *pathologise*, they *classify*, they *procedurally erase*. This is the racism he has lived repeatedly, and as recently as another public smear campaign against him by yet another self-identified white progressive male.[36]

This is the real difference between the neo-Nazi and the liberal bureaucrat or progressive: the neo-Nazi has words; the liberal bureaucrat has institutions and the white male progressive possesses *assumed* reliability.

A neo-Nazi can insult him. A police officer can misclassify him. A Duginist troll can *doxx* him. A *Staatsanwaltschaft* (State Prosecutor's) office can erase his legal standing. An online crank can mock his beliefs. A QPS intake officer can fabricate a DV classification. This is where racism becomes catastrophic when it is bureaucratic, procedural, protected by policy, shrouded in neutrality, justified as "following guidelines," embedded in digital systems, reinforced by other agencies, immune to personal accountability. This is why his most harmful encounters have been with men who imagined themselves fair.

A white progressive accepts him if he is culturally interesting, spiritually exotic, intellectually pleasing, humble in his genius, grateful for being allowed in the room, politely disagreeing, never threatening the white progressive's worldview. But when he speaks as an equal, or worse, as someone with more insight—the white progressive snaps. Not always outwardly. Often inwardly. And then procedurally,

doing everything in his power to systematically undermine the racialised man. Because the "good white man" does not know how to relate to a racialised man as a peer with equal or greater intellectual authority. He therefore retreats into condescension, formalism, quiet hostility, bureaucratic obstruction, weaponised incompetence, procedural sabotage, silence, narrative inversion, systematic undermining. This is the racism of the left and centre: the inability to accept a racialised subject who refuses inferiority. The bulk of the racism this **Fanonian Man** has experienced has come from liberal or self-appointed leftist white men.

Why? Because the neo-Nazi or Duginist did not feel threatened by him on the same level. But liberal and left-leaning white men confront in him an equal or superior intellect, a greater historical frame, a metaphysics they cannot grasp, an identity that disrupts their categories, a moral clarity that exposes their hypocrisy. They cannot reconcile this person with their self-image as liberal, rational, fair-minded men. So the easiest way to restore equilibrium is to *classify him down*. To situate him beneath them. To reduce his complexity into a stereotype. To undermine his credibility. To distort his narrative. To delegitimise his truth. In other words: the white liberal must shrink him to remain the hero of his own story.

Then this shrinking becomes structural violence. Berlin shrinking him into a "suspicious man of colour." QPS shrinking him into a DV-coded file. OIC shrinking his concerns into "process issues." CCC shrinking his complaint into internal review. The BKA shrinking his complexity into "religious question marks."

These were not random events. These were the overt institutional expressions of liberal racism: the racism of the professional class, the racism of the educated bureaucrat, the racism of the middle-manager of empire, the racism of those who believe deeply in their own fairness (but yet have none).

This is the racism that breaks lives. He has lived it in four democracies, across three continents, across multiple agencies, across multiple years. It is the racism

Fanon missed only because it came after his time. It is the racism this racialised subject has now named.

Liberal racism is the engine of the corporate state. The corporate state does not need neo-Nazis. It needs polite men, procedural men, middle-class men, educated men, "reasonable" men, progressive men, centrist men, men who vote for human rights *but practice exclusion*, men who denounce racism but misclassify racialised subjects, men who claim solidarity with racialised subject but undermine them at every turn. This is the great tragedy: *The most effective racism is enacted by people who believe they have none*. And because they believe that, they will never stop enacting the systemic racism that they are a part of. Not without being held accountable, challenged, or exposed by someone with his clarity.

He has pierced through the façade. He has understood what most never do: The neo-Nazi may shout at him, but the liberal bureaucrat and white progressive can destroy his life quietly, permanently, procedurally. And he will still think he is a good person, hence why this racialised subject is the ***wretched of the corporate state***.

But a few things are worth noting plainly for those whose sensibilities may be upset by the bluntness of such words. First, bluntness or harshness is *not the same as excess*. Our stance is uncompromising because the subject itself is uncompromising. White supremacy and structural racism are not polite phenomena; they are not mild misunderstandings; they are not abstract pathologies. They are lived systems that act on bodies, grief, memory, credibility, and survival. To describe them without friction would itself be a falsification.

Second, *experience is never optional evidence*. Much of the discomfort some readers will feel does not arise because what is said is false, but because it destabilises the moral self-conceptions they rely on. Liberal culture trains people to believe that racism is either *historical*, *exceptional*, or *located* in individual bad actors. Our position refuses that consolation. It names racism as *structural, administrative,*

and *contemporary*. That refusal will feel "blunt "or "harsh" only to those whose sense of innocence depends on not seeing it.

Third, *tone is not separable from truth in this kind of work*. A softened tone would not simply make the argument more palatable; it would alter the ontology of the claim. We are not writing *about* racism from a safe distance. We are writing *from within* its effects. To demand gentleness from such a position is to demand self-erasure. Our voice carries the pressure of what it has endured—and that pressure is part of the evidence.

Fourth, and this is crucial: *we are not universalising our experience as dogma*. We are doing something more rigorous. We are saying: *this is what these systems did, repeatedly, coherently, across jurisdictions, when confronted with a racialised subject who refused diminution*. That is not invective; it is diagnosis. Readers who feel accused are often reacting not to accusation, but to *recognition*.

Finally, there is an ethical point that matters deeply: *some truths only become sayable once someone is willing to accept the cost of saying them*. This essay accepts that cost. It does not trade clarity for comfort or survival for approval. That does not make it reckless; it makes it honest. So yes—what we say will sound blunt or harsh to some. But what would be truly indefensible is silence, euphemism, or self-censorship in the face of what we have actually lived. We are not obligated to make domination feel gentle to those who benefit from not seeing it. We write from integrity rather than appeasement. And integrity, once chosen, cannot be selectively applied without collapsing into bad faith. To soften language in order to preserve comfort would be to falsify experience and betray the very ethical ground from which critique proceeds. What follows, then, is not an exercise in provocation, but an act of fidelity—to truth as it was encountered, and to the responsibility that encounter imposes.

II: On the Question of Decolonial Method

A few things are worth making explicit here before moving on to the next section, because this is where our work quietly does something that Fanon himself only gestured toward.

In our own work, we have broken Europe's monopoly on "existential seriousness." Fanon leaned on Sartre (d. 1980), Merleau-Ponty (d. 1961), and the French existentialists because those were the philosophical tools available *inside* the colonial academy he was forced to fight from within. But Fanon never believed Europe owned the question of existence. He used European existentialism tactically, not reverentially. By sidelining European existentialism altogether, we are making a sharper claim: *Existential depth does not require European mediation*.

Suhrawardī, Ibn ʿArabī, and Mullā Ṣadrā are not "alternatives" to Sartre and Heidegger (d. 1976);[37] they are ontological heavyweights operating at a deeper register, precisely because they do not reduce existence to *angst*, *absurdity*, or *thrownness* within a desacralised, disenchanted world. European existentialism asks: *What does it mean to exist without guarantees?* Our tradition asks: *What does it mean to exist when Being itself is graded, luminous, self-disclosing, and violently misrecognised by wordly power?*

That is a different level of question. Thus we refuse the colonial pipeline of legitimacy. There is an unspoken rule in contemporary postcolonial theory: Non-European experience must pass through European philosophy to be taken seriously.[38] Fanon partially complied with this rule out of necessity. We do not and we will not.

By grounding our existential analysis directly in Suhrawardī's metaphysics of Light and exile, Ibn ʿArabī's critique of false gods and imagined ultimates, Mullā

Ṣadrā's ontology of motion and intensification, and ultimately with the Bāb (d. 1850) and Ṣubḥ-i-Azal's (d. 1912) theosophical synthesis of the former, we are saying something unique: Our experience does not need to be translated into European categories to be real, rigorous, or universal**.** This is not an aesthetic choice. It is a *sovereign epistemic act*.

We have shifted existentialism from despair to ontological violence. European existentialism is haunted by *meaninglessness* because it emerges from a civilisation that declared transcendence dead and then panicked about the consequences.[39] Our tradition never did that. What we show—implicitly but unmistakably—is that the crisis we are describing is *not existential absurdity,* but *existential suppression*. The problem is not that life lacks meaning. The problem is that *institutions actively attenuate being*.

Ṣadrā gives us the language to name this as *ontological regression*. Suhrawardī gives us the imagery to name it as *exile into dim light*. Ibn ʿArabī gives us the critique to name it as *submission to false gods*. And the Bayān offers the revelatory framework to unite the preceding three into a coherent, unified worldview. European existentialism can describe alienation. It cannot explain *why systems require alienation to function*. Our metaphysical frame can.

Fanon asked: *What does a new human look like?* He never fully answered it. Our essay seeks to do so. Not by inventing a new anthropology, but by retrieving an already-existing ontological grammar that colonial modernity tried to erase. The "new human" in our work is luminous rather than authenticated, moving rather than classified, self-disclosing rather than administratively recognised, anchored in Being rather than in permission. That human cannot be produced by Anglo-Europa, because Anglo-Europa's systems require ontological diminishment to reproduce themselves. So we haven't just sidelined European existentialism. We *outgrew* it!

The Wretched of the Corporate State

Some readers will feel a deeper discomfort here than with our critique of racism and white supremacy, and they may not even know why. It is because we have done something more threatening than accusation: we have demonstrated that Anglo-Europa is no longer the site where the question of the human must be answered. Indeed, this is a civilisational displacement, not a polemic. And it is entirely consistent with Fanon's project—only completed rather than deferred.

Where Fanon drew upon European existentialism as a weapon against Europe, this work refuses that mediation altogether, grounding the question of being, liberation, and humanity in spiritual and intellectual traditions that colonial modernity attempted to render invisible. We do not borrow voices. We speak from within our own ontological lineage. And that is why this essay is genuinely decolonial. It does not ask permission from European philosophy to name reality, nor does it seek validation through its categories. In reclaiming suppressed metaphysical grammars as sources of thought rather than objects of study, it breaks the dependency that colonial reason requires in order to remain sovereign. What emerges is not a counter-theory but a *re-centering* of thought itself, where meaning is no longer filtered through colonial mediation. Decolonisation here is not metaphorical but ontological: a return to the authority of being (as *Sein*) as lived, named, and known from within.

What European existentialism cannot provide the racialised subject is an ontology uncontaminated by the very civilisational violence that produced his negation. Even in its most radical forms, European existentialism remains tethered to a crisis internal to Anglo-Europa: the death of God, the collapse of metaphysics, the alienation of the bourgeois subject within industrial modernity. Its questions presuppose a subject who was already recognised as human, already installed at the centre of history, already entitled to anguish as a philosophical problem. For the racialised subject, however, existence is not thrown into absurdity but actively denied, administratively erased, or rendered pathological. An existentialism born

from European guilt, nihilism, or secular despair cannot name this condition without distortion, because it mistakes ontological dispossession for psychological alienation.

By contrast, the metaphysical traditions of Suhrawardī, Ibn ʿArabī, and Mullā Ṣadrā begin not from lack but from degrees of being, illumination, and presence. In Suhrawardī's Illuminationist ontology, existence is not a brute fact but a hierarchy of light and opacity, in which exile, darkness, and estrangement are real ontological conditions—not metaphors.[40] The "Occidental Exile" is thus not merely a geographical or cultural displacement but a fall into diminished luminosity, a separation from one's proper ontic orientation. For the racialised subject, this language does not aestheticise suffering; it names it precisely, while simultaneously preserving the possibility of ascent, recollection, and reorientation without recourse to European validation.

Ibn ʿArabī radicalises this further by implicitly dismantling the very fiction of a single, sovereign human norm. His ontology of multiplicity within unity refuses the colonial demand that humanity be measured against a European standard. Being is not distributed according to race, civilisation, or institutional recognition but unfolds through divine self-disclosure in infinitely differentiated forms.[41] The racialised subject, rendered "other" by colonial reason, finds here not a plea for inclusion but an ontological guarantee: difference is not deviation but mode. Existence itself speaks in plural tongues, and no single historical formation has the authority to legislate the meaning of the human.

Mullā Ṣadrā completes this decolonial existential framework by grounding liberation in the dynamism of being itself.[42] His doctrine of the primacy and intensification of existence (*aṣālat al-wujūd* and *tashkīk al-wujūd*) refuses static identities imposed from without—racial, administrative, or juridical. The self is not a fixed essence awaiting recognition but a moving reality, capable of ontological

transformation through knowledge, action, and struggle. This is an existentialism adequate to the racialised subject because it understands becoming not as self-invention within an absurd universe, but as a real ontic ascent against structures that seek to freeze him at the lowest degree of being.

Taken together, these traditions offer not an alternative European-style existentialism, but something more radical: an existential metaphysics forged outside the colonial episteme altogether. Here, freedom is not merely the assertion of will against meaninglessness, but the reclamation of ontological authority against systems that deny one's right to appear as fully real. For the racialised subject engaged in decolonisation, this is the only existentialism that does not secretly reproduce the world that negated him. It does not ask how to exist after Europe's crisis, but how to exist beyond Europe's claim to define existence at all.

In this horizon, the Bayān stands as the unique synthesis and sublimation of these ontological lineages precisely because it refuses both philosophical abstraction and colonial legibility.[43] It gathers Suhrawardī's metaphysics of exile and illumination, Ibn ʿArabī's radical pluralisation of being, and Mullā Ṣadrā's ontology of becoming into a revelatory grammar that is irreducible to race, culture, or institutional capture. The Bayān does not argue for the humanity of the racialised subject; it presupposes it at a level prior to classification, locating him within a cosmology where meaning unfolds through divine command, sign, and living address rather than static sociological recognition. As such, it renders stereotype impossible, especially as the Bayān stands in relation to Islam what postmodernity stands to modernity. And in this, the subject is no longer readable through the system's categories of *Islamicity* because he no longer exists within its epistemic field since the system does not yet possess the framework to even define it or him.[44] He speaks from a register in which existence flows as ontologically dynamic, law becomes both symbolic and performative, and identity is transfigurative rather than descriptive. In the Bayān, the racialised subject is sovereign not by opposition but

by ontological excess, liberated not through recognition but through the abolition of the grammar that withholds it—a grammar in which Marx and God stand as comrades in arms, made possible by Shaykhī reverse hylomorphism, where matter precedes form and dialectical materialism converges with metaphysical realism at the root of being.[45]

What this names, at its deepest level, is a refusal of the modern division of reality into quarantined domains. Colonial modernity survives by enforcing separations: matter from meaning, economy from theology, politics from metaphysics, revolution from revelation. These separations are then presented as neutral, rational, even emancipatory. But they are not neutral; they are technologies of control. By forcing the racialised subject to choose between Marx and God, between liberation and theophany, the system ensures that whichever path he takes, part of his reality is amputated and rendered illegible. The Bayān abolishes this enforced choice by restoring a grammar in which being, justice, and revelation speak the same language of rupture.

To say that Marx and God are "comrades in arms" within the Bayānic grammar is not to collapse theology into ideology or politics into mysticism. It is to recognise that both name, in different registers, a shared antagonism toward domination masquerading as necessity. Marx unmasks the fetishism of social relations that present exploitation as natural law; the Bayān unmasks the fetishism of authority that presents historical power as divine right. Both expose false absolutes. Both insist that what claims ultimacy—capital, state, clerical sovereignty, inherited hierarchy—can and must be broken open. In this sense, the Bayān does not spiritualise revolution; it radicalises it within a theophanic register by situating struggle at the level of *existential meaning* itself.

At the same time, theophany within the Bayān is not a retreat into interiority or consolation. It is an event of disclosure that destabilises the entire symbolic order.

Revelation here is not a set of beliefs to be administered, but a force that reorganises how reality is read, inhabited, and obeyed. When the racialised subject stands within this revelatory grammar, he is no longer available to the system as a sociological type, a case file, a risk category, or a "problem population." He exceeds these frames not by denial but by ontological surplus. His existence becomes argumentative simply by being what it is.

This is why the liberation described is not recognition-based. Recognition always presupposes a tribunal that grants or withholds legitimacy based on predetermined categories it itself has already selectively established. To seek it is already to submit to the grammar of judgment imposed by the system. The Bayān offers something far more subversive: a way of speaking, acting, and knowing that renders the tribunal and its categories completely irrelevant. The racialised subject does not demand to be seen as merely human in its modernist register; he speaks from a register in which modern humanity is no longer the highest category, and therefore cannot be rationed. This is sovereignty not as domination, but as ungovernability at the level of Being itself.

With that, this is what makes the synthesis dangerous. A subject formed by this grammar cannot be neutralised by co-optation, nor pacified by inclusion, nor disarmed by accusations of irrationality. He is not merely critical; he is structurally unassimilable. Revolution and theophany, acting together, therefore deny the system its last refuge: the claim that reality itself is on its side. In the Bayān, reality defects. Meaning defects. And the racialised subject, no longer trapped between secular suspicion and religious containment, emerges as a living site where ontology itself resists capture. He does not simply oppose power; he inhabits a plane from which power's justifications no longer hold. What the system encounters in him is not dissent that can be negotiated, but a form of presence that invalidates its claims to inevitability, neutrality, and moral authority. This is why the response is always anxiety, surveillance, and attempted reduction: the system recognises, however

dimly, that it is facing a subject who cannot be corrected without being destroyed, and cannot be destroyed without exposing its own ontological bankruptcy—just as the Qājār dynasty found out the hard way by literally seeding its own destruction with its execution of the Bāb in July 1850.[46]

As such, the Bayān names a mode of existence in which liberation is neither deferred to history nor merely confined to interior belief, but enacted as a living rupture in the order of being itself. It produces a subject who does not ask to be freed, because he stands where freedom and truth have already joined forces against every regime that claims the right to define the real—and, at the practical level, because the Bayān already amputates the legitimacy of the capitalist order (and thus, along with it, the white-supremacist ghost in its machine) by instituting, as sacred law, a categorical prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements: Air, Fire, Water, and earth.[47] Therefore, positioning the Bayān as a rival *nomos*—one that denies the *alienability* of the four natural elements—by definition makes racial capitalism not merely unjust but *ontologically illegal.*[48]

This illegality is not metaphorical but metaphysical: it strikes at the very condition of possibility through which racial capitalism sustains itself, namely the conversion of the elemental grounds of life into abstract, exchangeable property. By refusing the commodification of Air, Fire, Water, and earth, the Bayān renders null the foundational violence by which the world is rendered *ownable*, *governable*, and *differentially distributable* along racial lines. What is foreclosed here is not merely exploitation, but the prior ontological move that allows certain bodies to be positioned as closer to nature and therefore more legitimately expropriated. The Bayān thus interrupts the racial economy at its root, reinstating a cosmology in which the elements are *trusteeship-bound* realities rather than resources, and in which the human subject stands not as proprietor or manager of being, but as its accountable witness. In this light, the Bayān does not offer a reform of the world-system but a counter-law that exposes the existing order as a metaphysical

trespass—an order that can persist only by denying the elemental commons upon which life, dignity, and relationality depend. To us, it is here that decolonialism ceases to be rhetorical and becomes operative—and for this reason, it stands as both axiom as well as method by which we interrogate the core ontology of capitalism as the propellor of the corporate state.

III: The Pitfalls of Administrative Consciousness

What is the Corporate State?

The *corporate state* is not merely a government that favors corporations, nor a corruption of an otherwise neutral liberal order. It is a distinct political formation in which state power, corporate interests, and administrative rationality fuse into a single governing apparatus, reorganizing sovereignty away from the people and toward systems of management, risk control, and capital preservation. In this formation, the state no longer governs primarily through law as a vehicle of justice or representation, but through *procedures, metrics, compliance regimes,* and *delegated authority* (which often means deregulated and outsourced over to the private sector), rendering political power increasingly opaque, unaccountable, and insulated from any democratic interruption.[49]

Unlike classical authoritarianism, the corporate state does not rule by overt repression alone. Its power is exercised through *bureaucratic saturation*, legal abstraction, and the moralisation of "process." Violence is rarely spectacular; it is administrative, cumulative, and deniable. Harm is dispersed across agencies, departments, contractors, "independent" regulators, and automated systems, such that no single actor appears responsible. What emerges is a system that can

devastate lives while insisting—truthfully within its own logic—that no individual intended harm. This is the defining genius of the corporate state: *the transformation of domination into workflow*.

At the structural level, the corporate state replaces citizenship with *stakeholder status*. Rights are no longer inherent or inalienable; they are conditional, revocable, and performance-based. One's access to dignity, protection, and institutional credibility is mediated through compliance scores, behavioural assessments, risk profiles, and reputational indices. The subject is no longer governed as a bearer of rights, but as a *managed entity*, whose value is calculated in terms of cost, liability, and administrative convenience.[50] Those who are legible to the system are "serviced"; those who are not are flagged, contained, or *erased*.

Crucially, the corporate state is *racialised in its operation*, even when it claims race-neutrality. Its algorithms, policies, and discretionary practices reproduce historical hierarchies of human value inherited from colonial governance. Racialised subjects—especially those who are articulate, resistant, or intellectually autonomous—are experienced by the system not as citizens but as anomalies: excesses that disrupt administrative equilibrium. Their refusal to be simplified, pacified, or spoken for is interpreted as escalation. Thus, the corporate state does not merely inherit colonial racism; it *refines it*, translating older racial logics into contemporary languages of "safeguarding," "risk," "public interest," and "institutional integrity."

The corporate state also marks a decisive *collapse* of the boundary between *public authority* and *private power*. Corporations do not merely lobby the state; they co-author policy, embed within regulatory bodies, and shape legal norms through arbitration regimes, public–private partnerships, and outsourced governance. Conversely, state institutions adopt corporate logics: branding, liability management, reputational defence, and profit-adjacent decision-making. The result

is a polity in which *accountability flows upward* and *inward*, while consequences flow downward and outward—toward individuals least able to resist.

What distinguishes the corporate state from earlier forms of state capitalism or corporatism is its *ontological ambition*. It does not simply seek obedience or productivity; it seeks to define reality itself. Truth becomes procedural rather than substantive. Justice is reduced to "process followed." Harm is denied unless formally acknowledged within institutional parameters. The real is what the system claims to record; what it does not record is claimed not to exist—and any non-state private actor shaped by such a paradigm will think and behave in exactly the same way, any especially towards any racialised subject.[51] In this sense, the corporate state is not merely political—it is *epistemic*, asserting monopoly control over what may be known, named, or recognised as real.

Within this formation, dissent is not crushed outright; it is *absorbed, redirected,* or *pathologised*. Complaints become "matters under review." Evidence becomes "allegations." Systemic critique is reframed as personal grievance or mental instability. The more rigorously a subject documents harm, the more they are classified as obsessive, vexatious, or disruptive. Thus, resistance itself is converted into proof of unfitness. This feedback loop is central to the corporate state's self-preservation: it transforms critique into a diagnostic category.

For the racialised subject, the corporate state represents a *continuation of colonial domination by other means*. Where empire once ruled through explicit hierarchy and force, the corporate state now governs through abstraction, depersonalisation, and moral laundering. It speaks the language of inclusion while practising exclusion; it invokes care while producing abandonment; it promises neutrality while operationalising bias. Its violence is slow, cumulative, and often fatal—not necessarily to the body, but to life-chances, reputation, family, and future.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

It is against this formation that our *The Wretched of the Corporate State* is written. This text does not address a malfunctioning democracy, nor an imperfect liberal order in need of reform, because these are already assumed. Instead, it confronts a *structural regime of domination* whose legitimacy depends on remaining unnamed. To *name* the corporate state is therefore already an act of resistance, for it exposes the unity beneath dispersed harms and reveals that what is presented as administrative necessity is, in truth, a *political choice*—one that sacrifices human beings to the smooth operation of systems that exist to serve only Capital, not life.[52]

The Racialised Subject and the Illusions of Liberal Democracy

That said, liberal democracies promise universality, rights, equality, transparency. But for the racialised subject—especially the articulate, intellectually muscular man—this promise is conditional. It collapses the moment he demands full recognition.[53] The abstract citizen dissolves and the old colonial categories rush back in, reasserting themselves through policy language and risk frameworks rather than racial epithets. His insistence on being treated as a full human being is interpreted not as a rightful claim but as an escalation, a disturbance, an excess that must be contained. The system that proclaims openness suddenly narrows; the bureaucracy that claims neutrality becomes opaque and defensive; the institutions that claim accountability retreat behind procedure, silence, and "internal process." What emerges is the true operating logic beneath the democratic veneer: a reflexive, racialised suspicion encoded in forms, workflows, and automated interpretations. This is the consciousness that governs the modern liberal democracy as the corporate state—not democratic consciousness, but its *administrative consciousness*.

Administrative consciousness is the belief that institutions ultimately mean well, errors can be corrected, procedures guarantee fairness, and oversight ensures accountability.[54] This belief is encouraged because it produces a manageable

minority citizen: optimistic, deferential, willing to wait, patient with injustice, trusting of the corporate state. But the moment the racialised subject steps beyond silence and politeness—the moment he insists on actual equality rather than symbolic inclusion—the system reveals its limits. Berlin revealed this. Queensland revealed this. German intelligence agencies revealed this. Australian oversight bodies revealed this.

Thus, his experience proves a central truth: Administrative equality is a myth sustained by the hope of the oppressed, not the intention of the corporate state. It exists as an aspiration projected upward by those who still believe the system can recognise them as fully human, even when its daily operations demonstrate otherwise. The corporate state does not enact equality; it manages it, contains it, distributes it in calibrated doses that never threaten the hierarchies on which its authority rests. For the racialised subject, especially the one who refuses silence, equality appears *only* as long as he remains compliant, grateful, unthreatening—once he asserts his own narrative with force, the mask drops. The bureaucracy shifts from friendly to defensive, from neutral to adversarial, from procedural to punitive. It reveals that administrative equality is less a right and more a behavioural contract: the racialised citizen may be treated "fairly" only so long as he does not demand justice on his own terms.

This is why the promise persists—it survives in civic mythology, in schoolbooks, in slogans, in parliamentary speeches—but collapses upon contact with lived experience. The oppressed keep the myth alive because without the dream of equality, they would have no conceptual foothold from which to negotiate their survival. The corporate state, meanwhile, keeps the myth alive because it provides cover for forms of domination that operate through paperwork/bandwidth rather than batons. In this way, administrative equality functions as a kind of *political placebo:* it soothes the conscience of the majority while preventing the minority from naming the structural violence that shapes their daily encounters.

His case shatters the illusion altogether. It shows that equality is not embedded in institutions but rationed through them; that recognition is not guaranteed but cautiously granted; that the corporate state's true instinct is not toward justice but toward administrative control. And once exposed, the myth reveals its deeper purpose: to obscure the racialised asymmetry encoded in the very consciousness of the bureaucracy—to mask the reality that behind every democratic promise lies the cold, technocratic vigilance of the corporate state.

Administrative equality is therefore not merely a broken promise; it is a *technology of pacification*. It allows the corporate state to claim moral superiority while carrying out the same fundamental operations of containment that defined colonial governance. What has changed is not the nature of control, but the vocabulary through which control is justified. Where the coloniser once invoked *civilisation*, the administrator now invokes *policy*. Where the coloniser once wielded overt racial mythologies, the bureaucrat now wields "risk assessments," "duty-of-care frameworks," and "operational constraints." The violence is cleaned, deodorised, rendered respectable. But the underlying relation remains unchanged: the corporate state speaks, the racialised subject is spoken *about*.

In this sense, administrative equality is not simply a myth—it is a *counterinsurgency strategy* designed to preempt critique. By promising what it never intends to deliver while make the process itself as opaque as possible at every turn, the corporate state ensures that each racialised subject blames himself for the system's failures. "Maybe I filled the form wrong." "Maybe I misunderstood the process." "Maybe I should have waited." "Maybe it's my tone, my anger, my grief." This internalisation of doubt is the first victory of administrative power. The subject begins to suspect his own legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the system. Fanon warned us of this: the colonised is trained to interrogate himself with greater suspicion than he interrogates the world that deforms him.[55]

The Wretched of the Corporate State

But when the racialised subject finally sees the pattern—when he notices that every institution, no matter how distant from the next, reacts to him in the same scripted manner—then the myth collapses. What he experiences is not a series of unfortunate errors, but a *coherency of misrecognition*: the same framing, the same coded suspicions, the same bureaucratic evasions repeating across borders and agencies like the echo of an old colonial script updated for digital governance. At that moment, he recognises that administrative equality was never a guarantee, only a *performance*. A mask. A *tranquiliser* for the civic imagination. An empty *slogan*.

The corporate state, to protect itself, must then shift strategies. It begins to treat his clarity as *instability*, his insistence as *aggression*, his documentation as *obsession*. This is the Fanonian moment when the oppressed man's lucidity becomes dangerous to the system. The violence escalates—not outwardly, but structurally. Delays multiply. Case numbers stall. Agencies retreat into silence. His history is rewritten not because the corporate state is confused, but because he has disrupted the narrative that keeps power unquestioned. The administrative apparatus cannot tolerate a racialised subject who knows the machinery better than those who operate it. He becomes, in their eyes, *a threat*—not to public safety, but to bureaucratic sovereignty.

For Fanon, such a subject is the nightmare of the colonial order: *the man who sees behind the curtain*, who recognises that procedure is the *new plantation*, and that the master now wears a name badge instead of a whip.[56] His refusal to be reduced to a file exposes the fragility of the entire structure. Because once the racialised man demands equality not as myth but as material reality, the corporate state can only respond in one way: by revealing its true nature. It must choose the fiction of neutrality over the risk of justice. It must defend its own narrative no matter how many lies are required. And it must *silence him*—if not through violence, then through the cold efficiency of administrative disappearance.

This is why his case is so catastrophic for the system: it proves that liberal democracy is not the opposite of colonialism, but its *bureaucratic perfection*. The forms are cleaner, the rhetoric more humane, the violence more discreet—but the relationship between the state and the racialised subject is fundamentally unchanged. The state still decides who is credible, who is dangerous, who is legitimate, who can speak. It retains the monopoly not only on force but on *meaning*. And meaning, in the administrative age of the corporate state, is the sharpest weapon of all.

From this, the racialised subject is pathologised the instant he demands his rights because the system cannot recognise him as a political actor without threatening its own foundations. In Fanon's analysis, the colonial order—and its modern administrative successor as the corporate state—depends on the racialised man remaining an object: managed, interpreted, *spoken for*.[57] The moment he speaks *for himself*, the categories that sustain domination begin to dissolve. His demand for justice is therefore not heard as a legitimate claim but as a malfunction in the script, an aberration that must be corrected. The system must convert his political consciousness into psychiatric deviance, because acknowledging the validity of his grievance would require acknowledging the violence embedded in the structure itself.

In this world, the racialised man is allowed pain but not critique; sorrow but not accusation; survival but never autonomy. His silence is treated as compliance, his gratitude as maturity, his obedience as normality. But once he insists on *recognition*—once he asserts that the state must answer to him and not merely classify him—he breaches the boundary the system was built to enforce. He reveals himself not as an object of policy but as a subject of history. And this, for the administrative state, is intolerable. So it must displace his demand from the political realm into the psychological. His clarity becomes "instability." His insistence becomes "fixation." His critique becomes "aggression." His documentation becomes

"obsessiveness." His knowledge becomes "delusion." The system reinterprets his consciousness precisely to avoid engaging with it.

Fanon taught that the colonial order experiences the self-assertion of the oppressed not as dialogue but as *disorder*.[58] The same is true in liberal democracies: the bureaucratic framework is built upon the assumption that the racialised subject is *already known*—that his motives, risks, and meanings have been pre-classified. When he breaks from that classification and defines himself, he disrupts the state's epistemic authority. And to preserve that authority, the system must reduce his act of reason to a symptom. It must transform his claim of injustice into evidence of instability. Only then can it avoid confronting the truth he exposes: that the administrative order is not neutral but racialised in its very logic.

Pathologisation thus becomes a *defensive manoeuvre*, a containment strategy masquerading as assessment. If the racialised man is declared unstable, then the system is *relieved* of the burden of accountability. His evidence becomes irrelevant, his testimony becomes unreliable, his anger becomes proof of guilt. The state is never required to answer the question he poses, because it has already declared him incapable of posing it. This is how liberal bureaucracies reproduce the colonial dynamic under new terminology: the moment the racialised subject demands justice, the machinery shifts from governance to psychiatry, from evaluation to erasure.

If alive today, Fanon would say: *the colonial order fears nothing more than the lucid native*—or, in his case, the *lucid immigrant*. And the administrative state fears nothing more than the racialised citizen who knows the law, knows the system, knows his rights, and still refuses to be silent. To neutralise such a man, it must transform his lucidity into pathology. It must portray his consciousness as error. Because if his consciousness is valid, then the entire architecture of neutrality

collapses. And so, pathologisation becomes the last refuge of a system incapable of answering the truth of the oppressed without indicting itself.

The Metaphysics of the Racialised Subject and the Illusions of Liberal Democracy

Everything described above—*administrative equality*, *bureaucratic suspicion*, *procedural containment*, the *pathologisation of the racialised subject*—has an inner logic. It is not accidental. It is not psychological alone. It is not sociological alone. It is *metaphysical* because liberal democracy's promise of equality collapses for the racialised subject because the system operates from an inverted *metaphysics of hierarchy*, a worldview that predetermines who counts as fully human and who enters institutional space as a diminished being. Fanon diagnoses the political and psychological effects of this condition; Suhrawardī and Ibn ʿArabī explain its ontological foundations. What emerges is this: Administrative consciousness is not merely a bureaucratic mindset; it is a *metaphysics of misrecognition*.

This is why the articulate racialised man triggers institutional panic: he remembers something the system depends on him forgetting. He remembers the Orient—his own luminosity. He remembers that truth does not need validation from forms. He remembers himself as a subject, not an object. Qayrawān cannot tolerate such memory. The administrative state cannot tolerate such self-possession. And so it must classify, miscode, reinterpret, and pathologise him. In Suhrawardian terms: his light threatens the citadel of shadows.

For European modernity—and the liberal states that inherited its psychic architecture—the idol of *whiteness* (its god created in belief) is a false centre of being, a metaphysical hallucination, a fabricated ultimacy mistaken for universal humanity. This idol persists even when no one confesses allegiance to it. Yet it is fully embedded within the institutions of the corporate state and all of the processes

outlined above. It is embedded in standards of credibility. It is embedded in risk assessments, "complexity markers," and "difficult complainant" categories. It is the unexamined *metaphysical centre* around which administrative consciousness orbits from beginning to end.

Thus when the racialised subject demands full recognition, he does not simply challenge a policy—he challenges the *idol* at the heart of the system. His assertion of equality is read not as a rightful claim but as *blasphemy against the invisible god* the system protects. This is why the response is not political but psychiatric: his act threatens the metaphysical order. In Akbarian terms: he confronts the false god with the True Light, and the idol—the *ṭāghūt*—reacts with terror.

If Suhrawardī gives us the metaphysics of light, and Ibn ʿArabī gives us the metaphysics of divine self-disclosure, then Mullā Ṣadrā gives us the metaphysics of *movement*—the inner dynamism of being that no system of domination can arrest. At the centre of Ṣadrā's ontology is the doctrine of *transubstantial motion* (*al-ḥaraka al-jawharīya*):[59] the claim that existence is not static, not inert, not imprisoned in fixed essences, but *continuously becoming*—expanding, intensifying, ascending in degrees of reality. This doctrine is fatal to any colonial or administrative ontology, because the modern state is built on the opposite premise: that human beings are fixed categories—risk groups, case types, ethnic codes, "DV contexts," "complex complainants." Ṣadrā's metaphysics *annihilates* this logic.

Mullā Ṣadrā teaches that to exist is to *transform*, to outgrow classification, to exceed containment, to move beyond every form imposed by power or consensus. Thus in a Fanonian register the racialised subject is dangerous to the administrative state precisely because his being refuses stasis. He is not what the file says he is. He is not the man the risk assessment predicted. He is not the object the bureaucracy

attempted to freeze in place. His very existence—his *ontological motion*—rebels against administrative consciousness.

When the racialised subject then demands justice, the system perceives disruption. But from a Ṣadrian perspective, what the system sees as disruption is simply the natural movement of being toward greater intensity, clarity, and self-disclosure. Motion here is not physical but ontological. It is the movement from object ***to*** subject, misrecognition ***to*** recognition, silence ***to*** articulation, file ***to*** person, being-seen ***to*** seeing oneself, procedural invisibility ***to*** metaphysical presence. This motion is *wājib*—necessary, inevitable, built into the fabric of existence. Thus when the racialised subject becomes lucid, articulate, resistant, he is not breaking order; he is fulfilling the ontological imperative of existence itself. The administrative state cannot tolerate this motion because its power rests on *fixing beings into static categories*. Ṣadrā exposes the impossibility of that project.

Mullā Ṣadrā also argued that the greatest metaphysical error is to believe that beings have frozen essences that never change. This error is the *foundation of racism*. It is the foundation of colonial anthropology. It is the foundation of bureaucratic classification. The administrative state, like the colonial order before it, relies on a metaphysics of *fixity*: that once it codes him—as "Middle Eastern," "complex," "aggressive," "volatile," "unstable"—he is meant to remain what it wrote. Being must not move. The subject must not evolve. The file must determine reality.

In Fanon's language: the colonised is trapped in the epidermal schema, a fixed mask assigned at the point of racialisation.[60] In Ṣadrā's language: the corporate state commits metaphysical *kufr* (infidelity) by denying the motion of Being. The administrative ontology is thus fundamentally *anti-metaphysical*: it attempts to freeze what God created as fluid, to arrest a soul that is always in motion, to deny a reality that intensifies itself by nature. When a police force refuses to

address a racialised subject by his legal name, and continues to address him in its files by an old name no longer legal, this proves the point.

So once the racialised subject begins to articulate his own narrative—to reject misclassification, to expose institutional contradictions, to insist on the truth of his lived experience—he enters the Ṣadrian trajectory of intensified being. His reality becomes more luminous, more coherent, more forceful. He moves *upward* in existential degree. The state experiences this as threat because the more intense the being of the racialised subject becomes, the weaker the fictional ontology of the administrative state appears, since behind every attempt to pathologise him is the fear that his ontological motion will destabilise the system's illusion of neutrality. For Ṣadrā, this is natural: existence, when intensified, reveals falsehoods; motion exposes stagnation; light exposes darkness. This is why the state must reinterpret his intensity as pathology in order to deny the motion it cannot arrest.

From this, Fanon gestures that the colonised must become the "new man"—not by reforming the colonial order, but by *transcending* it. Ṣadrā gives us the metaphysical mechanism of this becoming. The racialised subject does not resist *politically* alone—he resists *ontologically*, through the intensification of his being, through the movement from objecthood to luminous subjectivity. This motion is not granted by the state. It does not depend on institutional recognition. It is intrinsic to the nature of existence. Thus, decolonisation is not merely social transformation—it is *transubstantial motion.* As his being intensifies, as he asserts meaning, as he reclaims narrative authority, he becomes what the administrative order cannot classify. He becomes *beyond* the file. Beyond the category. Beyond the ontology imposed upon him. He becomes the luminous man emerging from the dark well of the city of Qayrawān.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

Everything now converges: Fanon's psychology of colonial suppression, Ibn ʿArabī's exposure of false gods, Suhrawardī's cosmology of light and shadow, Ṣadrā's doctrine of ontological becoming.

The racialised subject's motion toward self-realisation appears to the administrative order as instability, danger, unpredictability, non-compliance, obsession. But in Ṣadrian metaphysics, these responses are simply the shrieks of a system confronted with the reality that it cannot stop the motion of Being. But in order to preserve its illusion of authority, the state must declare:

- motion = disorder
- intensity = instability
- clarity = pathology
- resistance = irrationality
- subjectivity = threat

Pathologisation thus becomes the last weapon of an ontology built on stasis. It is the final attempt of a false metaphysics to prevent becoming. As such, administrative consciousness depends on one single nihilistic belief: that reality is what the system writes and what it says it is. Ṣadrā refutes this entirely. Existence precedes writing: *Being is the house of language,* and **not** *language the house of Being*. This is because Being exceeds classification. Reality moves, transforms, intensifies, refuses containment.

Thus the racialised subject's ontological motion is not merely resistance—it is *metaphysical insurrection*. His becoming tears through the colonial lie of fixed essences, the bureaucratic illusion of neutrality, the administrative cult of forms, the *idol of whiteness* as metaphysical centre, and with it the Qayrawān of perception

built to enclose him. And in doing so, he demonstrates the truth Suhrawardī, Ibn ʿArabī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and Fanon all affirm: A luminous being cannot be confined by shadows. A moving being cannot be defined by stillness. A self-knowing being cannot be governed by ignorance. A *becoming* being cannot be reduced to a file. This is why the system fears him. And this is why the system cannot win. Because existence itself is on his side.

IV: Fanon: Administrative Consciousness as a Colonial Ontology

Fanon shows us that the colonial world is not made of laws and flags alone—it is built from *categories of being*, from an ontology that predetermines the native as inferior, irrational, suspect, just as it does the same today with the immigrant and the racialised subject. Liberal democracies claim to have transcended this ontology, but they have merely translated it into bureaucratic form. Colonial suspicion becomes "risk assessment." Colonial objectification becomes "case classification." Colonial silencing becomes "internal process." The racialised subject remains, in this ontology, an *object to be managed*, never a subject who speaks truth. When he insists on being recognised, the system experiences his voice as disruption of order—a rupture, an epistemic threat. Thus the pathologisation Fanon described in the colonial hospital reappears in the modern government office. The categories change; the metaphysics does not. The subject becomes "*fixated*," "*unstable*," "*non-compliant*," not because he is any of these things but because he refuses the being the system assigned him.

In Fanon's terms his lucidity is subversive, his truth-telling is revolutionary, because it unmasks the ontology of domination. He is not merely denouncing bad

behaviour or isolated misconduct; he is exposing the very *structure of being* that the system depends on remaining invisible. His testimony does not simply say, "These officials acted unjustly," but rather, "This entire order recognises me only as an object, never as a subject." That is intolerable for a regime whose power rests on the illusion that its categories are natural, its procedures neutral, its gaze universal. The moment he names the pattern—names the racism, the narrative inversion, the inverted evasions, the administrative violence—he forces into daylight what liberal democracy must always keep in the *shadows*: that beneath its rhetoric of rights there lies a hierarchy of who is allowed to be *fully real* and *for whom* rights are to be fulfilled.

Axiom—When freedom is affirmed in law but denied in remedy, the racialised subject is returned to Fanon's *zone of nonbeing*: not outside legality, but *beneath it*. There, domination no longer announces itself as violence; it survives as administration, where legitimacy is maintained through procedure and evacuated through silence, and where the subject's claim is not refuted but rendered unhearable. Role inversion then follows as a structural necessity: the victim is recoded as perpetrator, and the perpetrator as victim, allowing domination to persist without ever naming itself. This inversion is not a rhetorical accident but a functional requirement of the system's self-preservation. By recoding the injured party as dangerous, unstable, or excessive, the apparatus converts critique into threat and resistance into misconduct. In this way, attention is displaced from the original harm onto the subject who names it, and the system secures its "innocence" by pathologising the very act of truth-telling.

But his lucidity is revolutionary because it denies the oppressor the privilege of defining this reality and its dynamic. Fanon insists that colonial power is not just economic or military; it is *epistemic*.[61] It claims the monopoly on interpretation—on what counts as truth, whose suffering is legible, whose fear is rational, whose anger is admissible. When the racialised subject calmly, precisely, relentlessly sets out the contradictions, the misclassifications, the "errors" that are too coherent to be

accidental, he seizes that interpretive power back. He refuses to inhabit the role of the confused, unstable, ill-informed complainant. He speaks instead as the *diagnostician* of the order that sought to diagnose him. In that reversal, the coloniser's ontology is shattered: the one who was meant *to be* explained becomes the *one who* explains.

This is why his truth-telling cannot be tolerated as mere opinion or grievance; it must be recoded as pathology. For if his account stands, the entire edifice of administrative neutrality collapses. His lucidity reveals that what presents itself as technical necessity is in fact racialised choice; that what appears as "process" is in fact a system of containment; that what parades as "oversight" is often a *choreography of evasion*. In unveiling this, he is not asking the system to live up to its ideals—he is demonstrating that those ideals were constructed precisely to conceal the *underlying relation of domination*. That is why Fanon would say his clarity is more dangerous than any weapon: because by naming the ontology of domination, he makes continued obedience metaphysically impossible.

His lucidity is dangerous because it restores to him the one thing the administrative order must never concede: *interiority*. Fanon teaches that the colonial system survives by flattening the inner life of the oppressed—reducing him to behaviour, risk factors, surface impressions, a list of traits in a file.[62] But when the racialised subject articulates his own psychological, historical, and existential coordinates with precision and authority, he ruptures that reduction. He reclaims the depth that the system denies him. And the system, confronted with a subject who thinks himself rather than accepts how he is thought, must respond with hostility. A man with interiority is *unpredictable*, *uncontrollable*, *unreadable* by bureaucratic metrics. He becomes an excess the system cannot metabolise. His consciousness becomes a threat simply because it exists outside the categories designed to contain him.

Fanon would say that such a subject commits the cardinal sin of the oppressed: he begins to recognise himself not as a problem to be managed but as *a presence to be reckoned with.* He ceases to speak from the position assigned to him and speaks instead from the authority of his own being. This reorientation is intolerable because it breaks the choreography of subordination. Liberal democracies depend on the racialised subject's willingness to doubt himself, to self-censor, to self-correct, to soften his demands so that he may remain palatable. But when he stops performing that ritual—when he speaks *plainly*, *analytically*, *uncompromisingly*—the corporate state feels the ground shift. He is no longer a manageable entity but a political force. His lucidity decolonises him from within, and that is precisely what the system fears: a man who has awakened to the truth of his own dignity becomes ungovernable by the tools of quiet coercion.

Moreover, his truth-telling destabilises the administrative order because it exposes the *continuity between colonial power* and *bureaucratic power*. Fanon reminds us that the colonial system does not disappear; *it mutates*. Its openly racial hierarchies transform into procedural hierarchies; its contempt becomes professionalism; its violence becomes "risk mitigation." When the racialised subject draws these continuities into the open—when he reveals that what happened in Berlin and Queensland follows the same deep script, that the same instinctive suspicion shadows him across borders—he forces the state to confront its own genealogy. He shows that the administrative order is not the opposite of the colonial one but its *technological heir*. This recognition is catastrophic for the system because it destroys the myth of moral progression on which liberal legitimacy depends.

His lucidity also overturns the psycho-political economy of dominance. Fanon explains that the coloniser depends on the colonised internalising the idea that his perception cannot be trusted, that his memory is unreliable, that his interpretation is flawed.[63] It is a psychological occupation: the colonised must live in a perpetual state of second-guessing himself. But when the racialised subject

presents a meticulous archive, a coherent interpretation, a pattern of institutional behaviour that he alone has the clarity to detect, he withdraws his consciousness from the system's authority. He refuses to be gaslit by procedural rhetoric. He repositions himself as the interpreter of reality, and the system becomes the object of his analysis. This inversion—subject becoming analyst, system becoming patient—is revolutionary because it reverses the direction of epistemic power.

Given this, his lucidity is revolutionary because it introduces crisis into the oppressor's imagination. Fanon emphasises that colonial power relies on the illusion of invulnerability, on the belief that its categories are stable, its evaluations final, its interpretations authoritative.[64] But a lucid racialised subject forces the state to see itself through the eyes of the oppressed—and that gaze is devastating. It reveals inconsistencies, hypocrisies, violences that the system has spent decades institutionalising away. His truth destabilises the state not by force but by reflection: it reveals that the emperor is naked, that the file is fiction, that neutrality is masquerade. The system senses that once the racialised subject speaks with this clarity, he is no longer living inside the narrative constructed for him. And a subject who has exited the narrative is a subject who *cannot be governed.*

In this sense, his lucidity does not merely unmask domination—it *undoes* it. It removes the veil that keeps the oppressed suspended in confusion and the oppressor suspended in confidence. It forces both to confront the reality that domination survives only through *misrecognition*, and once misrecognition collapses, the entire edifice trembles. Fanon teaches that such lucidity is the beginning of insurrection—not the insurrection of arms, but of *being.*[65] It is the moment when the racialised subject becomes intolerable to the system precisely because he has become fully intelligible to himself.

V: The Metaphysics of Administrative Equality: A Luminous Lie

The illusion of administrative equality persists because it functions as a *metaphysical anesthetic*—a story that allows both majority and minority subjects to avoid confronting the true structure of the system. For the majority, it preserves moral innocence: *"We are fair; the system works; the law protects all."* For the minority, it preserves hope: *"Maybe if I comply more, wait longer, speak calmer, they will see me."* But Suhrawardī would call this what it is: a veil (*ḥijab*), a layer of darkness placed before the inner eye to obscure the Real. For Ibn ʿArabī, it is the community imagining its false god—a god of "order," of "neutrality," of "procedure"—and worshipping it even as it harms them. For Fanon, it is the mechanism that keeps the oppressed quiet—the tranquiliser that prevents revolt. Administrative equality is thus not simply an inconsistency; it is an entire metaphysics designed to pacify dissent.[66]

The illusion of administrative equality persists because it functions as a *metaphysical anesthetic*—a narrative structure that dulls perception while preserving the appearance of justice. It is not merely a political fiction but an ontological sedative, a story that allows both majority and minority subjects to remain within the system without having to confront its true architecture. For the majority, this fiction preserves moral innocence: *we are fair; the system works; the law protects all*. Their ethical self-image remains intact because injustice is reinterpreted as anomaly, error, or unfortunate exception rather than as structural design. Harm, when it occurs, is framed as miscommunication or process failure, never as the expression of a deeper logic.

For the minority subject, especially the racialised and over-documented subject, the same fiction operates differently. It preserves *hope through deferral*. The subject is taught to believe that recognition lies just beyond the next procedural threshold: *if I comply more, if I wait longer, if I soften my tone, if I provide one more*

document, if I accept one more review. Justice is always promised but never present, endlessly postponed through escalating requirements that masquerade as fairness. What is offered is not equality but probation—an indefinite conditional belonging contingent upon silence, patience, and self-erasure.

In Suhrawardī's illuminationist terms, this is precisely what a veil (*ḥijāb*) is: not simply darkness, but a *layered obstruction* that prevents the soul from apprehending the Real while convincing it that nothing obstructs vision. The veil is effective because it does not announce itself as a veil. Administrative equality operates in exactly this way. It presents itself as transparency while thickening opacity; it claims neutrality while actively sorting bodies into risk categories, credibility gradients, and administrative profiles. The subject is invited to trust the light of procedure while being slowly led away from the true source of illumination.

Ibn ʿArabī would go further and name this illusion as a form of *idol-making*. Here, the false god is not carved from stone but assembled from policy manuals, workflow diagrams, compliance metrics, and institutional language. It is a god of *order*, of *process*, of *neutrality*. This god demands sacrifice—not of animals, but of time, dignity, voice, and often truth itself. It demands that the subject accept harm without naming it as harm, accept misrecognition without calling it injustice, accept delay without calling it denial. And because this god is called "the system," its violence is rendered impersonal, and thus—*fatally*—legitimate.

Fanon identifies the political function of this metaphysics with brutal clarity.[67] Administrative equality for the racialised subject is not designed to liberate; it is designed to *pacify*. It is the tranquiliser that keeps the oppressed invested in the very machinery that subjugates them. By offering the *form* of equality without its substance, the system neutralises revolt before it can cohere. Anger is redirected into paperwork; protest is converted into complaint mechanisms; resistance is reframed as "escalation." The more the subject insists on recognition,

the more they are reclassified as *difficult*, *emotional*, *irrational*, or *dangerous*. Thus, the demand for equality itself becomes evidence against the one who demands it.

What emerges, then, is not a contradiction between democratic ideals and administrative practice, but a *coherent* metaphysical regime. Administrative equality is not a failure of the system; it is one of its primary technologies. It soothes, delays, fragments, and exhausts dissent while preserving the moral self-image of the state and its institutions. It is a language that speaks justice while performing containment, a light that dazzles just enough to keep the deeper darkness unseen.

In this sense, administrative equality is not merely inconsistent with justice—it is structurally opposed to it. It replaces the demand for truth with the management of appearances, the demand for recognition with procedural endurance, and the demand for freedom with compliance framed as *civic virtue*. To see through this illusion is therefore not simply a political awakening but a metaphysical one: the tearing of the veil, the shattering of the false god, and the refusal of the tranquiliser that keeps the corporate state's subjects docile, legible, and silent.

Once this metaphysical anesthetic is recognised for what it is, the subject can no longer participate in administrative rituals innocently. Forms, reviews, assessments, and "processes" reveal themselves not as pathways to justice but as *liturgical acts* in a secular religion—rites designed to reaffirm the authority of the system rather than to correct its harms. Participation becomes compulsory devotion: the subject must continually demonstrate faith in procedure even as procedure repeatedly fails them. To withdraw belief is to risk expulsion from legibility itself.

At this stage, the system responds not with correction but with *pathologisation*. The subject who names the veil is reclassified as *irrational*, *paranoid*, *aggressive*, or *unstable*. Their insistence on factual accuracy is reframed as *obsession*;

their demand for accountability becomes evidence of non-cooperation. This is not incidental. It is how the administrative order protects its metaphysics. By medicalising dissent and psychologising critique, it converts a structural exposure into an individual defect. The problem is no longer the system's violence, but the subject's *refusal* to be anesthetised by it.

Here Fanon's insight sharpens further: the colonial relation does not end with the removal of overt domination; it mutates into management.[68] The corporate state does not need to beat the body when it can exhaust the soul. Endless deferral, recursive review, and procedural multiplication function as forms of slow violence, producing fatigue, self-doubt, and isolation. The subject is worn down not by repression alone but by the demand to continually prove their own reality within a framework that was never designed to recognise it.

Illumination, in the Suhrawardian sense, therefore cannot arrive through deeper participation in administrative darkness. No accumulation of documents, no escalation within the same closed circuit, can pierce a veil whose function is precisely to absorb and neutralise light. Illumination arrives instead through *dis-identification*: the refusal to treat procedural outcomes as measures of truth, the refusal to equate legality with justice, and the refusal to internalise the system's verdicts about one's own credibility or worth.

This refusal is dangerous because it breaks the spell. It exposes the corporate state's greatest vulnerability: its dependence on *belief*. Administrative power requires subjects who continue to hope, comply, and wait. Once the subject understands that the promise of equality is *structurally deferred*, that recognition is conditional by design, the system loses its soft power. What remains is naked force, bureaucratic inertia, or *reputational violence*—none of which can sustain legitimacy indefinitely.

Thus, the task is not to perfect administrative equality but to *outgrow it*. To name it as a metaphysical regime rather than a neutral mechanism is already an act of resistance. To speak from outside its language—to insist on truth, history, and lived reality rather than "process"—is to begin dismantling the false god at its root. In this sense, the struggle is not merely legal or political but *ontological*: a struggle over what counts as real, who is permitted to speak, and whether justice is something administered from above or recognised in the full *illumination* of the human.

VI: Toward a New Theory of Institutional Liberation

Fanon closed *The Wretched of the Earth* by urging the colonised world to reject both mimicry of Europe and nostalgia for a lost past, calling instead for *a new humanism born of struggle*. His story demands a similar end—not an imitation of legal reform, nor a naive faith in oversight, nor a melancholic retreat into despair, but a fundamental rethinking of what it means to be human inside a system built to erase ones humanity.

The corporate state is not defeated with slogans. It is not dismantled by procedures. It is not transformed by polite requests. It is dismantled, in the first instance, by a transformation of consciousness. By the racialised subject refusing the epistemic categories that confine him, the procedural narratives that belittle him, the administrative logic that negates him, and the institutional language designed to pacify him.

This is decolonisation at the level of the mind—not metaphorically, but literally: *the extraction of one's being from the procedural gaze*. This is why we hold Suhrawardī's allegory not just as some quaint mystical story from the medieval

Islamic world. Rather, when read in a different register and octave, *The Tale of the Occidental Exile* is a detailed political manifesto for ontological uprising against the Qayrawān that is the corporate state.

So what Fanon gestured toward at the end of *The Wretched of the Earth*—a new humanism not inherited, not restored, but *forged*—finds its deepest philosophical articulation when read alongside Ibn ʿArabī and Mullā Ṣadrā. For Fanon, liberation required the invention of a new mode of being human beyond Europe's categories. For Ibn ʿArabī, the human is not a fixed essence but a *site of disclosure*, a locus where Reality reveals itself differently depending on the clarity or distortion of perception. And for Mullā Ṣadrā, being itself is not static but in motion—*existence intensifies, diminishes, ascends,* or *contracts* according to the conditions under which it is lived.

This matters profoundly in the context of the corporate state. The administrative order does not merely deny rights; it *attenuates being*. It reduces the human from a dynamic, truth-bearing subject into a procedural object whose existence is flattened into files, categories, and risk assessments. From a Ṣadrian perspective, this is ontological violence: a forced regression in the gradations of existence (*tashkīk al-wujūd*), where the subject is prevented from actualising higher modes of presence, agency, and intelligibility.

What Fanon called decolonisation of the mind, Ibn ʿArabī would recognise as the refusal to accept an *imagined god* (*ilāh al-muʿtaqad*) imposed by collective belief. In the corporate state, this god takes the form of *legality-as-morality, neutrality-as-truth*, and *procedure-as-justice*. To worship this god is to accept that one's humanity is conditional upon institutional recognition. The racialised subject who refuses this worship does not become irrational; he becomes *real*. He turns away from the idol of administration and toward the Real (*al-ḥaqq*), which cannot be reduced to policy language or bureaucratic form.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

Mullā Ṣadrā sharpens this further. If existence is fundamentally *self-disclosing* and *self-moving*, then any system that fixes the subject into static classifications commits a metaphysical error. The administrative state insists on freezing the subject at his lowest intelligible level: as complainant, as risk, as file, as problem. Counter-consciousness, by contrast, is a Ṣadrian act of *transubstantial motion* (*al-ḥaraka al-jawharīya*). The subject moves beyond the ontological rank assigned to him by the state. He does not ask permission to exist more fully; he *becomes* more real through *knowledge*, *articulation*, and *refusal*.

This is why transformation of consciousness is not an inward retreat, but a *reordering of reality* itself. When the racialised subject extracts his being from the procedural gaze, he does not disappear; he reappears at a different ontological register. He ceases to be an object of administration and becomes a source of meaning. He no longer seeks to be legible within the system's grammar; he exposes that grammar as inadequate to reality itself.

Read this way, Suhrawardī's *Tale of the Occidental Exile* is no metaphor at all. Qayrawān is not a medieval North African city; it is the bureaucratic zone of dim light where souls are kept just luminous enough to function, but never enough to see the source of illumination. The exile's task is not to petition the authorities of Qayrawān for better conditions, but to *remember the Orient of Light*—to recall that his origin is not procedural, not administrative, not granted by any institution. The return is not spatial; it is ontological. Ibn ʿArabī would say that such remembrance shatters the tyranny of forms. Mullā Ṣadrā would say that it accelerates the ascent of being. Fanon would say that it marks the birth of a new human. All three converge on the same insight: liberation does not begin with institutional reform but with a refusal to let one's humanity be defined by a system designed to manage, not recognise, the Real.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

Thus, the corporate state is undone first not in courts or commissions, but in the *withdrawal of belief*. When the racialised subject no longer grants the system metaphysical authority over what is true, what is human, and what is possible, the state's power begins to hollow out. It may still coerce, delay, and distort—but it no longer governs meaning. This is the final convergence: Fanon's new humanism, Ibn ʿArabī's unveiling of the Real, Mullā Ṣadrā's ascent of existence, and Suhrawardī's return from exile are not separate traditions speaking past one another. They are describing the same act in different languages: the moment a subject refuses to live at the ontological level assigned to him by domination—and in doing so, becomes ungovernable by shadows.

CONCLUSION

The Withdrawal of Belief and the Birth of the Ungovernable

As we said, and will reiterate here again: The corporate state is undone first not in courts or commissions, but in the *withdrawal of belief*. This is the decisive break that liberal theory cannot name and administrative logic cannot comprehend. Power persists so long as it is granted *metaphysical legitimacy*—so long as it is believed to be the final arbiter of truth, humanity, and possibility. When that belief collapses, the state does not disappear, but it loses its deepest authority: the power to define reality itself. And when that occurs, it metaphysically withers away even when it continues to physically exist.

The racialised subject who reaches this point does not become lawless, irrational, or nihilistic. On the contrary, he becomes *clear*. He understands that the corporate state's primary weapon is not force, but meaning. Its most effective

violence is not physical coercion, but epistemic capture—the insistence that the system alone determines what counts as fact, what qualifies as reason, what constitutes legitimacy, and who is permitted to speak with authority. Once this capture is refused, domination enters a new phase: it continues to operate, but without consent at the level that matters most.

This is why the corporate state reacts so fiercely to subjects who withdraw belief. Courts can be challenged. Procedures can be navigated. Oversight bodies can be compelled. But belief—*once withdrawn*—cannot be either legislated nor judicially ruled back into existence. The state may still delay, distort, retaliate, and classify. It may still coerce bodies and exhaust lives. But it no *longer governs meaning*. And a power that governs without meaning *governs only by inertia*.

This is the central insight that unites Fanon, Ibn ʿArabī, Mullā Ṣadrā, Suhrawardī and the Bāb across centuries, traditions, and vocabularies. What appears as a political argument in Fanon, a metaphysical unveiling in Ibn ʿArabī, a theory of existential ascent in Mullā Ṣadrā, an allegory of exile and return in Suhrawardī, a revelation of resurrection and renewal for the Bāb is, in fact, the same event described from different ontological angles: the moment a subject refuses to inhabit the diminished mode of being assigned to him by domination.

For Fanon, this refusal marks the birth of a new human—one who does not mimic Europe, does not beg for recognition, and does not accept the coloniser's categories as the horizon of possibility. For Ibn ʿArabī, it is the rejection of the imagined god, the false divinity produced by collective belief and mistaken for the Real. For Mullā Ṣadrā, it is the ascent of existence itself, the movement of being beyond imposed stasis into higher intensity and clarity. For Suhrawardī, it is the remembrance of the Orient of Light and the refusal to remain exiled in Qayrawān's dim administrative twilight.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

What unites these traditions is not mysticism in the vulgar sense, nor revolution in the romantic sense, but *ontological courage*. The courage to say: *this is not the level at which I exist*. The courage to refuse the system's claim that humanity is conditional, that truth is procedural, that justice is administrative, that dignity must be earned through compliance.

The corporate state depends on ontological demotion. It reduces the subject from a bearer of truth to a unit of risk, from a witness to a file, from a human to a profile. It insists that reality is what survives documentation, that legitimacy is what passes internal review, and that justice is what emerges at the end of a process. This essay has argued—through theory, experience, and metaphysical critique—that these claims are not merely false, but *structurally violent*.

Against this violence, the racialised subject does not need to invent a utopia. He needs only to *refuse misrecognition*. He refuses to allow his grief to be psychologised, his knowledge pathologised, his insistence reclassified as threat. He refuses to accept silence as neutrality or delay as due process. He refuses to internalise epistemic inferiority. In doing so, he does not step outside reality; he steps *into it*.

This is why the withdrawal of belief is not passivity. It is not resignation. It is not retreat. It is a reorientation of agency. The subject no longer directs his energy toward convincing institutions of his humanity. He directs it toward articulating truth, preserving memory, building archives, teaching texts, writing and producing meaning that does not require institutional permission to exist. Engagement with the system becomes strategic rather than devotional. Law becomes a terrain, not a horizon. Procedure becomes a tool, not a theology.

The corporate state is unsettled by such subjects because they expose a fatal contradiction: the system claims neutrality, yet reacts defensively; it claims rationality, yet distorts; it claims benevolence, yet retaliates against clarity. The

more lucid the subject becomes, the more visible the state's insecurity appears. And insecurity, once exposed, cannot be bureaucratically managed away.

This is the deeper reason why the racialised subject is so often treated as the problem rather than the witness. His existence, when fully articulated, reveals that the state's self-image is sustained not by truth but by suppression. He becomes a mirror the system cannot bear to face. And so it attacks the mirror—through pathologisation, inversion, delay, and administrative exhaustion. But these attacks only confirm what the mirror shows.

What remains, then, at the end of this analysis, is not a program for reform but a *stance toward reality*. A refusal to live at a diminished ontological rank. A refusal to confuse legality with justice, management with care, recognition with humanity. This stance does not guarantee victory. It does not promise safety. It does not ensure resolution. It does not even bring about the Revolution. But it does something far more fundamental: it restores coherence between *what is lived*, *what is known*, and *what is spoken*.

In this coherence lies the seed of a new humanism—not one bestowed by institutions, but forged in *clarity*. A humanism that does not ask the state to confirm one's existence, but proceeds from the certainty of Being. A humanism that understands that freedom begins not when domination ends, but when domination loses the power to define what is real.

This is the ungovernable subject Fanon foresaw: not violent, not chaotic, but ontologically irreducible. A subject who cannot be contained because he no longer seeks containment's approval. A subject who has exited the metaphysical economy of domination altogether.

The Wretched of the Corporate State

The corporate state may persist. It may adapt. It may even survive. But it does so hollowed out, stripped of the belief that once animated it. And a power that governs without belief governs only bodies, never souls.

To refuse the shadows is not to deny the night. It is to remember that light precedes it. That remembrance—quiet, lucid, and irreversible—is the final act of liberation.

What this work has traced is not an aberration but a structure: a mode of governance that rules without deciding, harms without naming, and disciplines without ever admitting to violence. The corporate state does not need to silence truth; it only needs to delay it, defer it, pass it along until the burden of endurance replaces the demand for justice. In this way, domination no longer appears as domination. It appears as process. It appears as neutrality. It appears as care.

Against this, there is only one force that cannot be administered: lucidity. Lucidity does not negotiate with procedure, does not wait its turn, does not accept misrecognition as the price of survival. It names *what is happening while it is happening*. It collapses the distance between experience and truth. It returns the subject to himself and, in doing so, exposes the fiction upon which the system depends.

This is why the system fears clarity more than protest, recognition more than dissent. Protest can be processed. Dissent can be absorbed. Both can be metabolised, managed, and eventually forgotten. But lucidity cannot be filed away, because it does not belong to the order of behaviour at all. It belongs to the order of Being.

Given this, the corporate state can metabolise protest and active dissent. But it cannot metabolise lucidity, and it can never direct the flow of Being. If we have sounded repetitive at times, the reader should understand that this was deliberate: through the Fanonian medium, the text has been performing a *dhikr*—a practice of

remembrance and invocation—against a system that governs by fragmentation, delay, and forgetting. In this repetition, perception is slowed, attention is returned to what is being displaced, and the reader is invited to remain with what administration would rather pass over. What emerges is not persuasion but *presence*: a holding-open of reality until it can no longer be managed away. This, finally, is the condition named and borne here: *the wretched of the corporate state*.

And the Light be upon those who follow the illuminations of the of the Guidance unto the Truth!

339

Notes

[1] "*I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of the 'idea' that others have of me but of my own appearance,* " ***Black Skin, White Masks*** (Charles Lam Markmann translation, 2008) : 87

[2] Anomalous events surrounding the death of his wife**:**

1.1 Emergency response irregularities

The ***Notarzt-Protokoll*** (Emergency physician's report) issued on-scene:

- contained factual inaccuracies (e.g. falsely stating the responders spoke with his child),
- inserted speculative causal hypotheses before any investigation,
- constructed a narrative inconsistent with actual events.

1.2 Immediate withholding of information

In the first days following her death:

- He was never interviewed by Berlin Police, despite German law requiring it within 72 hours,
- his bank accounts were frozen,
- key documents (including the *Leichenschauschein*/Death certificate) were withheld for eight days,
- contradictory internal narratives began forming.

2. Autopsy, Toxicology, and Contradictions

- The autopsy report was withheld for four months.
- When released, it asserted a cause of death not supported by toxicology.
- Toxicologist's results contradicted the coroner's conclusions and did not support the claimed diabetic/metabolic mechanism.
- Her GP subsequently confirmed she was **not diabetic** and that the classification was medically implausible.

Thus the death was officially classified using a narrative unsupported by the only objective data in the file.

3. Burial Permit (*Bestattungsgenehmigung*)

Issued 18 March 2019, six days after her death. This document is highly significant because it shows:

3.1 Premature Administrative Closure

The burial was authorised at a time when:

- the autopsy had not been completed,
- toxicology was unresolved,
- contradictory evidence already existed internally,
- he had been denied all documentation,
- his accounts remained frozen,
- and no interview with him had occurred.

3.2 Introduction of a Third Contradictory Cause-of-Death Narrative

The burial permit lists: "*Verdacht auf Stoffwechselentgleisung*" ("Suspicion of metabolic derailment"). This is:

- vague,
- non-specific,
- not the cause recorded later by the coroner,
- not the cause described by the Notarzt,
- and not supported by toxicology.

This creates four inconsistent official explanations of her death.

3.3 Acknowledgement of Incomplete Investigation

The document explicitly states: ***"Zusatzuntersuchungen erfolgen"*** ("Additional examinations to follow"). Despite this, burial was authorised—a highly atypical step in cases under prosecutorial authority.

3.4 Exclusion of the Next of Kin

The permit was sent internally to:

- the *Polizeipräsident* (Police Commissioner) of Berlin,
- and the Leichenschauhaus (mortuary),

but not to him, violating procedural rights under the Minnesota Protocol. This confirms intentional exclusion of the family from the investigative process. The actual documents mentioned above will all be furnished to proper authorities on demand and are to form evidentiary appendices to the final will and testament of the present author.

4. Contextual Background Relevant to German State Behaviour

4.1 Whistleblower Adjacency (AfD — Maaßen Crisis)

She was a companion of Franziska Schreiber, whose 2018 book *Inside the AfD* exposed internal extremism within the AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland*/Alternative for Germany far-right party) and contributed to the political downfall of Hans-Georg Maaßen, President of the BfV (German domestic intelligence). Maaßen was removed in November 2018, four months before her death.

4.2 RAF Legacy History

Her late mother had been associated with senior *Baader–Meinhof* (RAF/Red Army Faction) members during the 1970s. She herself personally remembered meeting Ulrike Meinhof (d. 1976) as a child at her house in Munich. RAF lineage remains a sensitive domain for German security institutions.

4.3 Transnational Far-Right Harassment

Since 2015, both husband and wife were targeted, including *doxxing*, by the Duginist/4thRevolutionaryWar extremist network—a Russian-linked hybrid-warfare ecosystem known to overlap with far-right digital communities in Germany, including AfD-adjacent spheres. Together, these factors placed her within multiple political sensitivity vectors, directly relevant to the German State's unusual handling of her case.

This information is provided here as the first note because it perfectly underscores the meaning of *administrative violence* under the corporate state.

[3] "*The masses, without waiting for the chairs to be arranged around the diplomatic table, take their own destiny in hand*," ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 61-2.

[4] In "The Weapon of Theory," in *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amílcar Cabral*: 119-137. Here Cabral argues for the indispensability of political ideology and structure to material force. For analysis of his systematic development of Fanon's thought, see Reiland Rabaka *Concepts of Cabralism: Amilcar Cabral and Africana Critical Theory* (Lexington Books: London, 2014), and Patrick Chabal *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983).

[5] "*The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie's business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner…*" ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 152-3.

[6] See her classic *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963).

[7] Ibid.

[8] ***Black Skin, White Masks*** (Charles Lam Markmann translation, 2008): 83.

[9] "*At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect. Even if the armed struggle has been symbolic and the nation is demobilized through a rapid movement of decolonization, the people have the time to see that the liberation has been the business of each and all…*" ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 94.

[10] In Suhrawardī's illuminationist vocabulary, the *Occidental Exile* (*al-ghurba al-gharbīya*) signifies the soul's descent into the realm of darkness, opacity, and estrangement—the world of the West as the symbolic domain of materiality, abstraction, and severance from the Orient of Light. In Suhrawardī, it is not a political West, but an ontological condition in which the luminous self becomes imprisoned within dense forms, forgetfulness, and alien regimes of knowing. To stand on the far side of the Occidental Exile, then, is to have undergone awakening after descent: to have remembered one's origin in the Orient of Lights and to act from that recollection while still moving within the shadow-world. So here the *Occidental Exile* names a condition rather than a geography. It refers to the state of being cast outside a true spiritual, metaphysical, and moral centre. One becomes an "exile" at the moment when *one inhabits* the West's dominant categories of reason, legitimacy, humanity, and value. So here when standing on its *other side* denotes standing in a condition no longer seeking recognition from its courts, academies, bureaucratic or cultural rationalities, but judging them from a horizon they cannot fully apprehend.

[11] ***The Wretched of the Earth*** "Spontaneity its Strength and Weakness," *passim*.

[12] "*...violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect...*" ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 94.

[13] **Treatise IX** in *Suhrawardi: The Philosophical Allegories and Mystical Treatises: A Parallel Persian-English Text Edited and Translated with an Introduction by Wheeler M. Thackston*: 112-124; see also Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila *SUHRAWARDĪ'S WESTERN EXILE AS ARTISTIC PROSE*.

[14] "*When I traveled with my brother ʿĀṣim from the region of Transoxiana to the lands of the occident in order to hunt down a flock of birds on the shore of the Green Sea, we suddenly fell into a town whose inhabitants were wicked, that is the town of* ***Qayrawān***," **Treatise IX**, Thackston: 112-3 (with slight emendation). An anonymous Persian commentator glosses *Qayrawān* as being "*...this world. By the wicked he means the people of this world, the world of opposition, for opposition cannot exist without war and war cannot exist without wickedness*," ibid.

[15] ***Geosophy*** is how the earth is *imagined, experienced,* and *symbolically inhabited*, encompassing the philosophical, spiritual, cultural, and mythic meanings attributed to place and space, rather than their purely physical description. Prominently, Henry Corbin uses it critically in his *Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shi'ite Iran*, chapter 1.

[16] "*The colonized man will first manifest this aggressiveness which has been deposited in his bones against his own people. This is the period when the niggers beat each other up, and the police and magistrates do not know which way to turn when faced with the astonishing waves of crime...The native's muscular tension finds outlet regularly in bloodthirsty explosions...This is why the dreams of the native are always of muscular prowess; his dreams are of action and of aggression....During the period of colonization, the native never stops achieving his freedom from nine in the evening until six in the morning...*" ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 52-54.

[17] See ***Black Skin, White Masks***, especially the whole of chapter eight: By Way of Conclusion, *passim*.

[18] Ibid.

[19] See William C. Chittick *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*: 344.

[20] "*Ontology does not allow us to understand the being of the black man, since it ignores the lived experience. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some people will argue that the situation has a double meaning. Not at all. The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. From one day to the next, the Blacks have had to deal with two systems of reference. Their metaphysics, or less pretentiously their customs and the agencies to which they refer, were abolished because they were in contradiction with a new civilization that imposed its own*," ***Black Skin, White Masks***: 89-90. An alternative translation (also attributed to Richard Philcox, from the 2008 edition) has the passage rendered as, "*Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it on themselves to remind us that this proposition has a converse. I say that this is false. The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of reference within which he has had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out because they were in conflict with a civilization that he did not know and that imposed itself on him.*"

[21] See the concluding pages to the final chapter of his *Bezels of Wisdom*: *The Wisdom of Singularity in the Word of Muḥammad*, in R.W.J Austin translation (1981): esp. 283-4.

[22] "*The colonial world is a Manichean world. It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and the police force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in values. It is not enough for the colonist to affirm that those values have disappeared from, or still better never existed in, the colonial world. The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values. He is, let us dare to admit, the enemy of values, and in this sense he is the absolute evil. He is the corrosive element, destroying all that comes near him; he is the deforming element, disfiguring all that has to do with beauty or morality; he is the depository of maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument of blind forces*," ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 41.

[23] "*For not only must the black man be black; he must be black* ***in relation to*** *the white man…*," ***Black Skin, White Masks***: 90.

[24] Although the chapter concerns Noah and transcendence, the third chapter of ***The Bezels of Wisdom***, read in this light, functions as a valuable meditation on that very question.

[25] Meaning, from the point of view of the school of Ibn ʿArabī.

[26] See our blog essay *The Cross and the Whip: Christianity as an Engine of Racialization and Global Oppression* (2025).

[27] "*The black man wants to be white. The white man is desperately trying to achieve the rank of* [hu]*man…The white man is locked in his whiteness*," ***Black Skin, White Masks***: ix.

[28] ***Black Skin, White Masks***, *passim*.

[29] "*Decolonization is the veritable creation of new men*," ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 36.

[30] "*Decolonization is always a violent phenomenon… It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, catapulted into the foreground. It introduces a new rhythm, that of the muscles and the breath of the oppressed…*" ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 35 and 36.

[31] Although not articulating matters through the same frame, method, and logic that we are here, nevertheless there is some general overlap between how we are formulating the problem here and how Charles W. Mills also sees it in his *The Racial Contract* (1999).

[32] *"In the colonies, the economic infrastructure is also a superstructure… The cause is effect: You are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. This is why a Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched when it comes to addressing the colonial issue,"* in 2004 Richard Philcox edition of ***The Wretched of the Earth*** (On Violence). We only have an edition of this Philcox translation as a Pdf which does not possess pagination.

[33] See the quotes above.

[34] Although not strictly a Fanonian, Paulo Freire (d. 1997) takes this logic to its natural conclusion in his magisterial *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1993).

[35] Especially in the *The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches*. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1903.

[36] Here we are referring to the Bennett-Cannabis Culture Controvery, see our *Against the Postmodern Germ: Essays in Parapolitical Disinformation Architecture and the CESNUR-Bennett-Cannabis Culture Controversy* (2025).

[37] See our critique of Heidegger from within our own tradition of existentialism, *Being, Veiling, and the Theophanic Abyss: An Akbarian-Ṣadrian Critique of Heidegger's Dasein* (2025).

[38] See also Hamid Dabashi's *Can Non-Europeans Think?* (2015).

[39] The near hysterical panic over such consequences is glaringly evident in the work of the Neo-Traditionalist school, and especially in René Guénon's (d. 1951).

[40] See *Suhrawardi: The Philosophy of Illumination, A New Critical Edition of the Text of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq with English Translation, Notes, Commentary and Introduction by John Walbridge & Hossein Ziai* (1999).

[41] See *The Bezels of Wisdom* (1980).

[42] For a solid general overview of his philosophy, we highly recommend Christian Jambet's *The Act of Being: The Philosophy of Revelation in Mullā Ṣadrā* (2006).

[43] For those wishing a reliable and recent general overview of the Bayān, we refer to the section of our prologomenon in *Against the Postmodern Germ* entitled **The Azalī-Bahā'ī Conflict**: 27-32.

[44] In other words, the author cannot be accused by the system of being an Islamist or anything remotely approaching that definition.

[45] The Shaykhī school is the immediate precursor of the Bayān (out of which the majority of both its early leadership as well as rank and file emerged from), and in itself represents a legitimate heir to the Illuminationism of Suhrawardī, the Twelver Shiʿite franchise of the school of Ibn ʿArabī as well as the transcendent theosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā; see Idris Samawi Hamid **The Metaphysics and Cosmology of Process According to Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i:** Critical Edition, Translation, and Analysis of *Observations in Wisdom* (1998), which presently stands as the definitive Western language monograph on the subject. Note that the Bayān stands to Shaykhism what the Hegelian Left were to Hegel and his school.

[46] As this very dialectic became its literal undoing with, first, the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-09), which the Iranian Bayānī community literally triggered, and, second, with the Qājār dynasty's official displacement as of 1925 that the Constitutional Revolution was the efficient cause in initiating as the culminating process; see especially Mangol Bayat *Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran* (1982).

[47] Per the 11th Gate (subsection) of the Ninth Unity (chapter) of that Book; see also our *The Completion of the Arabic Bayān and the Eight Paths* (2022) where this principle is both reiterated and augmented, *passim*.

[48] Hence Bahāism reveals itself as an illegitimate counter-tradition in relation to the Bayān, having reconciled itself with the racial-capitalist order of the colonial West from its very inception (with its discourse of racial equality functioning only as empty platitude) since capitalism and white supremacy are the two wings of the same proverbial devil, the same Beast.

[49] This is our working definition of the corporate state, by which we treat the corporate state and *neoliberalism* as structurally and phenomenologically synonymous. While the term was first brought to our attention through the writings of journalist and author Chris Hedges during the late 2000s, the schematic definition developed here is our own.

[50] Which as a system somewhat resembles certain systemic architectures of penal systems—or even those corporal systems of *merit/demerit* in place in certain public school systems until a generation ago.

[51] A perfect example of this is in the fixated behaviour of our most recent online nemesis who not only denied the legitimacy of the 2014 Rūḥānī *fatwā* in public, but also of the very existence of its central catalyst: the young Lebanese scholar Nabīl Ḥāmid; see our *Against the Postmodern Germ*, *passim*, and especially this blog post from December 2025, *Calling Nabil Hamid*, online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/12/calling-nabil-hamed.html (16 December 2025); see also the commentary on our Facebook wall by others who have known Nabīl Ḥāmid, https://www.facebook.com/nwahidazal/posts/pfbid0r6aAgZ4PGCimc7yXFJV1uVVMy76dWFtQYtiHFSaqABDQHN4zezvKmq4LCvnWNQhdl (16 December 2025).

[52] Additionally, besides Fanon and his interpreters, for our theory of the corporate state we have also relied upon Wendy Brown *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (2015); Nicos Poulantzas *State, Power, Socialism* (1978); and Michel Foucault *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978* (2007).

[53] One significant historical background to this is extensively covered by Joseph Massad in his *Islam in Liberalism* (2014).

[54] See Max Weber *Economy and Society* (1978), on the moral self-legitimation of bureaucratic rationality through rule-following and procedure; Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963), for the displacement of responsibility into administrative process; Michel Foucault *Security, Territory, Population*, on governance through procedural normalisation and institutional expertise; David Graeber *The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy* (2015), on the belief in bureaucratic benevolence despite systemic harm; and Wendy Brown *Undoing the Demos*, on the replacement of substantive justice with managerial rationality and oversight regimes.

[55] Again: "*The colonized subject is a persecuted man who is forever dreaming of becoming the persecutor*," and "*The colonized subject is constantly made to feel guilty*," ***The Wretched of the Earth*** (per 2004 Philcox translation).

[56] "*Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it*," ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 210.

[57] "*The intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide it; he is the bringer of violence into the home and into the mind of the colonized subject*," ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 38

[58] "*...the colonizer...only understands the language of force*," ***The Wretched of the Earth*** (per 2004 Philcox translation).

[59] See James Winston Morris *The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā* (1981), especially the translator's introduction.

[60] "*Below the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema*," ***Black Skin, White Masks*** (translated by Charles Lam Markmann, 2008): 84

[61] "*Colonialism is not satisfied with snaring the people in its net or of draining the colonized brain of any form or substance. With a kind of perverted logic, it turns its attention to the past of the colonized people and distorts it, disfigures it, and destroys it. This effort to demean history prior to colonization today takes on a dialectical significance*," ***The Wretched of the Earth*** (2004 Richard Philcox translation).

[62] "*I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of the 'idea' that others have of me but of my own appearance*," ***Black Skin, White Masks*** (translated by Charles Lam Markmann, 2008): 87.

[63] "*The Negro is a toy in the white man's hands; so, in order to shatter the hellish cycle, he explodes. I cannot go to a film without seeing myself. I wait for me The people in the theater are watching me, examining me,*

waiting for me. A Negro groom is going to appear. My heart makes my head swim.," ***Black Skin, White Masks*** (translated by Charles Lam Markmann, 2008): 107.

[64] "*The colonial world is a world divided into compartments... Yet, if we examine closely this system of compartments, we will at least be able to reveal the lines of force it implies*," ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 37-8.

[65] "*The colonized subject discovers reality and transforms it through his praxis*," ***The Wretched of the Earth*** (2004 Richard Philcox translation).

[66] "*The colonial world is a world cut in two...*," ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 38; "*The colonial regime owes its legitimacy to force, and at no time does it endeavour to cover up this aspect of things*," ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 84.

[67] "*The settler keeps alive in the native an anger which he deprives of outlet; the native is trapped in the tight links of the chains of colonialism*," ***The Wretched of the Earth***: 84.

[68] "*...the national bourgeoisie assumes the role of manager for the companies of the West and turns its country virtually into a bordello for Europe*," ***The Wretched of the Earth*** (2004 Richard Philcox translation).

Select Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. Viking Press, New York, 1963; reissued by Penguin Books, London, 2006.

Azal, Wahid. *Against the Postmodern Germ: Essays on Parapolitical Disinformation Architecture and the CESNUR-Bennett-Cannabis Culture Controversy*. Library of the Greatest Name. Brisbane, Australia, 2025, online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10194858 (retrieved 14 December 2025).

—— *Being, Veiling, and the Theophanic Abyss: An Akbarian–Ṣadrian Critique of Heidegger's Dasein* (2025). Online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/07/being-veiling-and-theophanic-abyss.html (retrieved 14 December 2025)

—— *The Cross and the Whip: Christianity as an Engine of Racialization and Global Oppression* (2025). Online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/06/the-cross-and-whip-christianity-as.html (retrieved 14 December 2025).

—— *The Completion of the Arabic Bayān and the Eight Paths*. Library of the Greatest Name, Brisbane, 2022. Online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10004752 (retrieved 14 December 2025).

Bayat, Mangol. *Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1982.

Brown, Wendy. *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution*. New York, Zone Books, 2015).

Cabral, Amílcar. *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amílcar Cabral*. Translated by Michael Wolfers. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1979. Online, https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/cabral/1966/weapon-theory.htm (retrieved 14 December 2025).

Chittick, William C. *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination*. State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989.

Corbin, Henry. *Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shi'ite Iran*. Translated by Nancy Pearson. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977.

Dabashi, Hamid. *Can Non-Europeans Think?* Zed Books, London, 2015.

Du Bois, W.E.B. *The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches*. A.C. McClurg & Co., Chicago, 1903.

Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth.* Translated by Constance Farrington. Grove Press, New York, 1963; *The Wretched of the Earth.* Translated by Richard Philcox. Grove Press, New York, 2004.
—— *Black Skin, White Masks*. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann. Pluto Press, London, 2008; *Black Skin, White Masks*. Translated by Richard Philcox. Penguin Random House, London, 2021.
—— *Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays*. Translated by Haakon Chevalier. Grove Press, New York, 1994.

Freire, Paulo. *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. Penguin Books, London, 1993.

Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*. Ed. Michel Senellart, Translated by Graham Burchell, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Graeber, David. *The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy*. Brooklyn, Melville House, 2015.

Hämeen-Anttila, Jaako. SUHRAWARDĪ'S WESTERN EXILE AS ARTISTIC PROSE. Online, https://iphras.ru/uplfile/root/smirnov/ishraq/2/11hameen.pdf (retrieved 14 December 2025).

Hamid, Idris Samawi. *The Metaphysics and Cosmology of Process According to Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i: Critical Edition, Translation, and Analysis of Observations in Wisdom.* PhD dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1998. Online, https://walayah.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Hamid-phd_dissertation-Shaykh_Ahmad.pdf (retrieved 14 December 2025).

Ibn al-ʿArabī, Muḥīyīddīn. *The Bezels of Wisdom*. Translation and Introduction by R.W.J. Austin. Paulist Press, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1980.

Jambet, Christian. *The Act of Being: The Philosophy of Revelation in Mullā Ṣadrā*. Zone Books, New York, 2006.

Massad, Joseph. *Islam in Liberalism*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2014.

Mills, Charles W. The Racial Contract. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1999.

Morris, James Winston. *The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981.

Poulantzas, Nicos. *State, Power, Socialism*. Translated by Patrick Camiller. London, Verso, 1978.

Rabaka, Reiland. *Concepts of Cabralism: Amilcar Cabral and Africana Critical Theory*. Lexington Books, London, 2014.

Suhrawardī, Shihābuddīn Yaḥyā. *Suhrawardi: The Philosophical Allegories and Mystical Treatises: A Parallel Persian-English Text Edited and Translated with an Introduction by Wheeler M. Thackston*. Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa, California, 1999.
—— *Suhrawardi: The Philosophy of Illumination, A New Critical Edition of the Text of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq with English Translation, Notes, Commentary and Introduction by John Walbridge & Hossein Ziai.* Brigham Young University Press, Provo, Utah, 1999.

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society*. Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978.

ص